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DEPOLITICIZING FINANCIAL REGULATION
STEVEN A. RAMmiiEz*
Over the past few decades, scholars have called into question
the ability of regulatory agencies to ftmction effectively in fur-
therance of the public interest.1 Since midcentury, they have
amassed convincing evidence that agencies can be captured
through, for example, "iron triangles" between Congress, agencies
and those supposedly regulated.2 More recently, regulatory
scholars have articulated various theories of regulatory conduct
and used differing terminology to describe capture. Nonetheless,
there is broad agreement that special interests can act within
the context of political subsystems, where isolated regulatory
actors are subject to various forms of pressure, causing regulato-
ry policies to serve special, rather than public interests. These
political subsystem actors often can subvert regulation when
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. Professors
William Rich and Myrl Duncan reviewed an early manuscript of this Article and
provided many helpful insights. Professor Jeffery Worsham and Professor Joe Peek
also provided insights, in the areas of political science and economics, respectively.
Eric Kraft provided valuable research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684-87, 1802-13 (1975) (summarizing the legal schol-
arship demonstrating the disintegration of the policy bases for administrative regula-
tion and critiquing responses to problems of special interest domination and regula-
tory capture); see also Ronald A. Cass, The Meaning of Liberty: Notes on Problems
Within the Fraternity, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 777, 790 (1985)
("Take almost any government program at random, and a 'special interest' counter-
majoritarian explanation can be found that is more plausible than the public interest
justification for it.").
2. See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & POLICY § 7.12
(2d ed. 1997) (providing an overview of scholarship on problems of administrative
regulation).
3. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 335, 343 (1974) (stating the economic theory of regulation rejects the
use of the term "capture" as "inappropriately militaristic," but recognizes that private
interests may subvert regulation). Notably, scholars who have highlighted certain
limitations that plague any particular theory of regulation have not rejected such
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political conditions fail to provide appropriate checks and bal-
ances.4 Congress itself is frequently co-opted in much the same
fashion as are regulatory agencies.5 This Article explores whether
a certain degree of agency independence from the legislative and
executive branches can break down iron triangles and provide a
basis for effective depoliticized regulation, in the specific context
of financial market regulation, where now there is a compelling
need for such a regulatory framework. The Article concludes
that the Federal Reserve Board's administration of monetary
policy exemplifies the possibility of depoliticized regulation. The
Federal Reserve Board has demonstrated that if Congress pro-
vides broad delegation of authority to a singular agency with a
high degree of political independence, then effective regulation is
theories as partial explanations of regulatory conduct. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The
Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH.
U. L.Q. 179, 211 (1996) (arguing that public choice theory of regulation fails to explain
the ability of "unifying principles," such as racism, to thwart special interest attempts to
capture legislation).
4. There is also a wide consensus among political science scholars that generally
power is concentrated within political subsystems and exercised in favor of special
interests. See, e.g., JEFFREY WORSHAM, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: POLICY CHANGE,
CONGRESS AND BANK REGULATION 2 (1997). Professor Worsham observes, however,
that the adherents of this focus upon powerful special interests speak "several dis-
tinct dialects." Id. at 3. Some scholars speak in terms of iron triangles whereas oth-
ers speak of advocacy coalitions or capture theories. See id. Fundamentally, most
ascribe to Professor Lowi's thesis that the regulatory state has transformed our
democracy into government by special interests for special interests. See id.; see also
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 278-79 (2d ed. 1979) (impugning the
regulatory state because centralized power facilitates "personal plunder rather than
public choice" and is characterized accurately as "socialism for the organized, capital-
ism for the unorganized"). The classic definition of special interests is James
Madison's definition of a faction in The Federalist No. 10. He stated:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1961).
5. In fact, some have argued that "Congress is the key to the Washington es-
tablishment." MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTAB-
LISHMENT 4 (2d ed. 1989). In other words, Congress created the system of bureau-
cratic regulation and sustains its basic structure. This is why all "iron triangle" or
capture theories leave a substantial role for Congress. See, e.g., id.; see also Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV.
873, 924-25 (1987) (acknowledging that Congress can be hijacked by special inter-
ests).
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likely, free of special interest influence and of transitory political
forces having less than rational agendas. While focusing upon a
relatively narrow area of regulation, this Article argues that
effective, relatively nonpolitical regulation can be achieved with-
in the framework of our Constitution. Finally, using financial
market regulation as a model, this Article addresses the condi-
tions under which depoliticized regulation is most appropriate.
Financial market regulation provides an excellent context for
considering these issues because of its spectacular regulatory
failures and the current dynamics facing the regulatory struc-
ture governing our financial markets. The world financial sys-
tem is becoming exceedingly complex. Even the most respected
regulatory experts, including Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, have observed that with the accelerating globaliza-
tion of capital markets, regulators have insufficient knowledge
to prevent a major catastrophe.6 One major challenge is that the
world is more economically interdependent than ever. New tech-
nology has given rise to new types of transactions, particularly
derivatives transactions, that link financial institutions to mar-
kets around the globe.7 One market crash, in far off East Asia
for example, can roil financial markets in London, New York,
and Frankfurt. In the summer of 1997, East Asian instability
6. See Chairman Alan Greenspan, Understanding Today's International Financial
System, Remarks Before the 34th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Compe-
tition of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (May 7, 1998) <http//www.federal
reserve. Gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980507.htm> (stating that increased under-
standing is needed to stem "a systemic disruption" beyond comprehension).
7. A recent example of these links is the failure of a huge "hedge fund" known
as Long-Term Capital Management. See Steven Lipin et al., Bailout Blues: How a
Big Hedge Fund Marketed Its Expertise and Shrouded Its Risks, WALL ST. J., Sept.
25, 1998, at Al. Apparently, this fund failed to account for the Russian financial
meltdown of mid-1998 and lost billions in leveraged positions. See id. Financial insti-
tutions around the world, from New York to Zurich, had exposure to the fund. See
id. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York orchestrated a $3.5 billion bailout to
stem the market chaos that would have followed liquidation of the fund's assets. See
id. Major United States financial institutions injected cash into the fund to avoid
liquidation. See id. The final cost to American banks and securities firms is not
known. One Swiss bank has already written off its entire $678.5 million exposure to
the fund. See id. Amazingly, neither the financial institutions behind the fund nor
-the fund's management, which included two Nobel laureates in economics and a
former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, appeared to appreciate the risks of the
fund's positions. See id.
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took the financial world by surprise. The fact that regulators,
investors, and financial experts equally failed to predict the
gravity of the problems arising from the collapse of the "Asian
Tigers" demonstrates how rapidly the financial world is evolving.
This evolution has overwhelmed the legal system's ability to
keep pace, and raises a high-stakes and compelling question: Is
Congress institutionally capable of meeting challenges to regula-
tion in this area on a timely and thorough basis?
Concomitantly, globalization and technology have created
incentives for financial institutions and other business organiza-
tions to consolidate and reach beyond national frontiers. The
profit potential and increased girth of such consolidated entities
necessarily mean that these institutions have enormous economic
power.' In light of this and the increasing complexity of financial
regulation, the democratic process seems particularly ill-suited
for making informed decisions on matters of financial market
regulation. Voters have insufficient knowledge, time, and inter-
est to make appropriate electoral decisions on the basis of mat-
ters of financial market regulation.'0 In the absence of transitory
factors, such as severe economic dislocation, the public is not
aware of the course, much less the details, of financial market
regulation. This creates a disconcerting vacuum: the money and
8. Even as early as 1987, Professor Langevoort recognized that the regulatory
framework governing bank regulation was so obsolete that he argued the courts
should take an active role in construing statutes in a manner that reflected
changing economic realities. See Donald D. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and
the Judiciary Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regula-
tion, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 729-33 (1987). Even then it was clear that the basic
business of financial institutions was evolving rapidly. See id. at 673 ("Largely as a
result of changes in available technology, the banking marketplace has changed radi-
cally."); see also id. at 676-680 (describing the effect of technological advances on the
banking industry). See generally Thomas M. Hoenig, Financial Modernization: Impli-
cations for the Safety Net, 49 MERCER L. REV. 787, 787 (1998) ("Over the past twen-
ty years the world of finance has changed dramatically.").
9. One example of such behemoths is Citigroup, the $48 billion financial services
conglomerate formed as a result of a merger between Citicorp and Travelers Group
in 1998. See Matt Murray, Fed Approves Citicorp-Travelers Merger, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 1998, at A3.
10. See Brown, supra note 3, at 181 (suggesting that special interests can control
legislative outcomes "where the disorganized majority remains uninformed and unin-
terested").
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influence of the regulated-the financial institutions or business-
es themselves-can fill the vacuum and thus capture regula-
tion." Even when transitory factors awaken the electorate, the
popular alarm frequently triggers an overreaction, or a less than
rational reaction. This political failure leads to regulation that is
dictated largely by the weight of money interests, or political
overkill and "random agendas."'
To deal with these realities, the United States is burdened by
a fragmented system of financial market regulation. The cur-
rent, largely politicized system of financial market regulation
has fragmented regulatory power in an unprincipled and chaotic
fashion. Three factors have led to this irrational fragmentation.
First, on those occasions when the electorate focused on finan-
cial market regulation, it often cast its eyes upon the system
with a high degree of suspicion towards "big business.""3 Second,
statutory obsolescence has led to an outdated regulatory frame-
work.'4 Third, "big business" itself has seen strategic advantages
in protecting itself from competition and weakening regulatory
power. 5 After decades of pursuing this fragmentation, powerful
interests now are seeking the ability to assemble financial su-
11. Recently, observers have documented the pernicious influence of moneyed in-
terests upon law and regulation. See generally WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL
THE PEOPLE 12 (1993) ("Instead of popular will, the government now responds more
often to narrow webs of power-the interests of major economic organizations and
concentrated wealth and the influential elites surrounding them.").
12. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 19-20 (1993). Justice Breyer's
analysis of regulatory dysfunction is founded upon our government's efforts to regu-
late environmental risks. See id. passim. Many of his conclusions regarding systemic
problems in environmental regulation also are pandemic to financial regulation. Jus-
tice Breyer describes "random agendas" as a problem that arises because the general
public, for a number of reasons, fails to prioritize rational regulatory, agendas. See
id. at 19-20. This is transmitted through Congress to the agency, and results in reg-
ulatory agendas that are out of sync with an objective ranking of regulatory priori-
ties. See id. at 19-21. The electorate also has failed, for various reasons, to achieve
more perfect enlightment in the area of financial market regulation.
13. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of Corporate Finance, 91 COLum. L. REv.
10, 32-53 (1991) (demonstrating that populist suspicions towards "big business" as
well as special interests, such as managers and financial institutions, led to regula-
tory fragmentation of the financial institution industry).
14. See id. at 48-53.
15. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MG IT. SC. 3, 5 (1971) (arguing that regulation frequently is utilized to discourage
market entry and competition).
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permarkets or "universal banks," without any central regulatory
authority. 6 This fragmentation has led to a unique form of regu-
latory competition that has stifled the development of sound
financial regulation. To make matters worse, the largest corpo-
rations in America can choose from fifty different sets of state
laws for corporate governance. Financial market experts have
recognized that it is inappropriate for the government to erect
artificial barriers to competition and "to divide the financial
world into discrete segments."' What has been understated,
however, is that segmented regulation similarly is obsolete. This
dimension of political regulation adds an additional factor, spe-
cifically regulatory competition, in the pressures giving rise to
regulatory capture. Fragmentation of regulatory power spawns
real, not theoretical, problems and in the case of the savings and
loan crisis alone contributed to a $1 trillion regulatory fiasco.'
8
The current regulatory structure fails to balance appropriately
the costs and benefits of regulatory policy. Concentrated benefits
frequently are extended to powerful interests at the expense of
the general public, particularly if the costs are spread over the
long term. Similarly, regulation in its current state permits the ab-
sorption of easily concealed costs for the benefit of those inter-
ests that stand to achieve real benefits in exchange. Thus, dif-
fused and deferred costs are underweighted in policymakers'
decision-making processes. Political gridlock and agency infight-
ing has led to the reality that America has a twenty-first-century
economy that is governed by Depression-Era regulatory struc-
tures.'9 Consequently, American financial institutions and corpo-
rations are hobbled internationally and there are gaping holes in
the country's regulatory infrastructure. In short, the regulation
16. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking, 19 BROOK. J.
INIL L. 203, 221 (1993) ("I argue that universal banking is not only desirable, it is
inevitable."). Professor Macey notes that "everyone agrees that universal banking
means expanded powers for banks." Id. at 203. Interestingly, however, Professor
Macey does not consider the history of expanding financial institution activities in
his analysis of the economic desirability of universal banking. Recent history shows
that with expanded bank powers comes expanded bank risks.
17. ROBERT E. LrrAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, AMERicAN FI-
NANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 5 (1997).
18. See infra notes 372-417 and accompanying text.
19. Professor Langevoort attributes the problem of statutory obsolescence to "po-
litical inertia and special interest pressure." Langevoort, supra note 8, at 672.
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of financial markets is seriously dysfunctional. ° This Article
posits that these problems reflect the inappropriate political
influence that has corroded the public interest basis for financial
regulation.
20. This Article limits its assessment of the success of regulation to the area of
financial market regulation. Although a number of theories of regulation cast asper-
sions upon the very concept of regulation in the public interest, this Article argues
that agency regulation can be an effective means of vindicating the public interest.
One scholar has summarized concisely the competing theories of regulation:
[P]ublic choice . . . holds . . . that agencies deliver regulatory benefits to
well organized political interest groups, which profit at the expense of the
general, unorganized public. The neopluralist theory also takes organized
interest groups to be central to understanding regulation. On the
neopluralist view, however, many interest groups with opposing interests
compete for favorable regulation, and that competition is less lopsided
than the public choice view contemplates. Because the result of interest-
group competition often crudely reflects general interests, the neopluralist
theory is less critical of the regulatory state than is the public choice
theory. Like the neopluralist view, the public interest theory is also am-
bivalent toward regulatory outcomes. Whereas the neopluralist focuses on
interest-group competition, however, the public interest theorist concen-
trates on the general public's ability to monitor regulatory decisioumakers.
Where regulatory decisionmakers operate under conditions of significant
public scrutiny, the public interest theory holds that regulatory outcomes
tend to reflect general interest. Where, on the other hand, the relevant
decisionmakers operate without any oversight, they tend to deliver regu-
latory benefits to well organized interest groups at the public's expense.
Finally, the civic republican theory provides a picture of regulation rather
different from all three of its counterparts. According to it, agency deci-
sions, at least potentially, embody the polity's judgments about how com-
peting regulatory values-such as highway safety versus traveler conve-
nience, for example-are to be balanced. On this view regulation provides
occasion for collective deliberation about regulatory means and ends.
Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998). Professor Croley demonstrates persuasively that none of
these theories squares with observable administrative practice. See id. at 166 ("[No
theory of regulation is vindicated by a hands-on look at administrative process.").
This Article does not attempt to contribute to any theory of regulation; instead, it
focuses on a problem, the subversion of regulation in the area of financial markets;
identifies distortions consistent with each of the above theories; and proposes a prag-
matic legal solution to that problem.
This Article also recognizes that any major restructuring of financial market
regulation needs to account for the enormous success of the American economy.
Since the advent of regulated capitalism, in the mid-1930s, the American economy
has posted impressive growth while avoiding any prolonged economic disruption. The
burden regarding structural changes in economic regulation is rightfully upon those
proposing change. A necessary corollary to this is that change should be narrowly
tailored, and of proven efficacy, to address well-proven problems.
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The foregoing discussion highlights the many needs of our
modern economy with regard to financial regulation. First, regu-
latory policies must be determined through a process that maxi-
mizes the degree to which expertise may be brought to bear
upon financial regulatory problems in order to respond to the
challenges posed by globalization and increased complexity in
financial markets. Second, regulation in this area must be able
to respond to sudden changes in financial markets with rapid
regulatory adjustments. Third, regulatory power must be cen-
tralized. Fourth, regulation of financial markets must be freed
both of inappropriate political pressure and of inappropriate spe-
cial interest influence. In short, financial market regulation
presents a classic context in which an expert and independent
agency is needed. Beyond this recognition, however, the ques-
tions that must be addressed are the degree of independence
that is appropriate, and the legal structure needed to secure
such independence.
This Article examines the degree to which depoliticizing finan-
cial market regulation can stem the problems discussed above.
Financial market regulation is a vast subject matter; for pur-
poses of this Article financial market regulation means the law
of the capital markets of the United States. This Article at-
tempts to articulate a theory of depoliticized regulation that can
address the most obvious components of financial market regula-
tion: the regulation of the public securities markets, as well as
regulation of financial intermediaries such as banks, insurance
companies, mutual funds, pension funds, and other financing
institutions. Although presently there is no unified regulatory
structure for these activities, this Article posits that there
should be one. This Article demonstrates that the very fact that
the regulatory system in this area has not been centralized is
due to inappropriate and politically influenced regulation. Ulti-
mately, this Article envisions centralized financial regulators
with a great degree of political insulation. It is not possible, in
the context of this Article, to review the history and failures of
regulation in such a vast area. This Article searches instead for
recurring patterns of regulatory failure in these areas, attempts
to reach reasoned conclusions as to the causes of such failures,
and articulates a proposed solution to these failures.
510 [Vol. 41:503
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This Article recognizes that ultimately all law is political,2 '
particularly under the United States Constitution. Inappropriate
political influence nevertheless can be minimized and nearly
eliminated. In other words, the political nature of legal regula-
tion is best thought of as a continuum, where on one end purely
political regulation exists (exemplified best, perhaps, by the
federal government's budget process), and on the opposite end is
the regulation that is most free of political influence (exemplified
by the Federal Reserve Board's administration of monetary
policy). Part I explores agency independence, including an analy-
sis of the maximum degree of insulation from political influence
possible under the Constitution, and the problems of regulatory
capture. Part II assesses the efficacy of depoliticized regulation,
with a particular focus upon the Federal Reserve's management
of monetary policy regulation. Part Ill reviews the recurring
problems of the current political regime of financial regulation.
Part IV articulates a proposal for imposing further depoliticized
regulation in the vital area of financial market regulation. This
Article concludes that any reforms of our financial market regu-
latory structure should include an aspirational goal of creating
regulatory agencies endowed with a high degree of political
independence.
21. Indeed, even the United States Supreme Court has not escaped this reality. In
February of 1937, President Roosevelt asked Congress to add up to six Justices to
the United States Supreme Court. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of
Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347-400. This plan
responded to a series of Supreme Court decisions striking down important parts of
Roosevelt's New Deal. See id. Roosevelt's initial plan was a smashing failure, but a
second plan nearly succeeded in the summer of 1937. See generally William E.
Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death, 1985
DUKE L.J. 673 (describing a lesser-known, second attempt by Roosevelt to 'pack" the
Supreme Court in 1937). The Supreme Court defused Roosevelt's initial plan some-
what when it began to take a more expansive approach to federal power. See id. at
673. The failure of the second plan also can be attributed to the Court's broadened
approach as well as the untimely death of the bill's primary supporter, Senator Joe
Robinson. See id. at 687. This demonstrates that no lawmaking organ under our
Constitution is immune from political pressure.
2000] 511
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I. AN ASSESSMENT OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE AND
DEPOLITICIZATION
Administrative agencies date to the beginning of the Republic.
The first Congress passed three statutes conferring administra-
tive powers.22 These agencies, like their modern counterparts,
exercised adjudicative, legislative, and executive power.2' By the
early part of the twentieth century, administrative agencies
became a popular choice for addressing a wide variety of social
problems.24 The Great Depression revealed serious deficiencies
in the nation's economic structure and a number of agencies
were created to address these shortcomings. Among these were
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Social Security Board.25 In our
federal system of government, the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, appoints the officers operating these
agencies who thus do not face election. The explosive growth of
agencies in the last one hundred years represents, therefore, a
transfer of power from elected officials to nonelected officials.
More fundamentally, the delegation of massive regulatory power
to administrative agencies that are not directly responsive to
electoral politics represents an additional check on democratic
lawmaking.26 Some commentators have recognized that the ad-
22. See KOCH, supra note 2, § 1.3.
23. See BERNARD SCmvARTZ, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW § 1.13 (3d ed. 1991).
24. See id.
25. See KOCH, supra note 2, § 1.3. Unfortunately Congress has been far more
adept at creating regulatory agencies than coordinating them. For an overview of the
tangled web of bank regulation, see Hearings on Financial Structure and Regulation
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous.
and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong. 619 (1973) (charting the jurisdiction of the three pri-
mary federal bank regulatory agencies). As complicated as this regulatory web is,
when considering the regulatory environment facing the entire financial services in-
dustry, as this Article does, one must consider a myriad of other regulatory agencies.
The most important of these are the SEC, and the regulator of the thrift industry,
the Office of Thrift Supervision or its predecessor, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB).
26. Of course, one way to view this check on democratic lawmaking is as a recog-
nition that voters cannot hope to comprehend all aspects of government regulation.
This perspective views agency lawmaking as necessary to give meaning to the dem-
ocratic process by providing for the election of leaders accountable for managing
512 [Vol. 41:503
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vent of such vast administrative power amounts to the creation
of a "fourth branch" of government. Agencies can act with real
independence from the executive and legislative branches only if
endowed with a high degree of independence. Further, true
independence from the executive and legislative branches de-
pends upon many factors, including the breadth of the power
delegated to the agency, its source of funding, its legal structure,
and the degree of political commitment to the agency's indepen-
dence.
At the height of the New Deal, the Supreme Court struck
down delegations to agencies based on the principle that broad
delegations of Article I power were not permissible. 8 Modern
decisions have held, however, that Congress can delegate legisla-
tive power to administrative agencies and insulate those agen-
cies from the "political winds that sweep Washington."29 There
are theoretical limits to the extent of such delegations. The Su-
preme Court has long held that Congress may delegate legisla-
tive power, *'ithout offending the constitutional requirement
that Congress hold the legislative power of the federal govern-
ment, as long as Congress provides intelligible principles to
guide the agency in exercising delegated power."0 Indeed, it has
government regulation.
27. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-89 (1952) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting) ("Administrative bodies . . . have become a veritable fourth branch of the
government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories.'); REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITEE ON ADmInmTRATIm MANAGEMENT 7, 83 (1937) (referring to
regulatory agencies as the "headless fourth branch of the Government").
28. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (striking down
delegation of governmental functions); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) ("The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to
transfer to others the essential legislative function with which it is thus vested.");
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (stating that Congress can dele-
gate broad administrative authority so long as Congress articulates the essential
policies and standards).
29. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986) (upholding delegation to the Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission of the power to adjudicate commodities dis-
putes).
30. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (finding that "intelligi-
ble principle" guided the delegation of authority to the President to superintend
court-martials); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1991) (upholding dele-
gation of power to the Attorney General to criminalize substance possession);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (upholding delegation of power
20001 513
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been sixty years since the Court last struck down legislative
delegations, even though Congress often employs vague and
sweeping delegations to achieve its goals."1 Moreover, those deci-
sions that have stricken delegations often involved delegation in
its "most obnoxious form"-the administration of government
powers by private actors. 2 Similarly, the delegation doctrine has
also continued to operate as a rule of statutory construction,
allowing the Court to interpret narrowly those delegations that
may raise issues of excessive delegation. 3 Even in its most his-
torically virulent form, the delegation doctrine has not operated
to strike down delegations to government agencies of broad
powers accompanied by reasonably specific articulations of poli-
cies and standards. 4 In short, the Constitution permits broad
delegations of authority to administrative agencies.
The Constitution also limits the structural independence of
administrative agencies so as to avoid the creation of a despotic
agency without any political accountability or control. The Ap-
pointments Clause of Article II requires that the President ap-
to United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate federal sentencing guide-
lines).
31. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO-
CESS 16-18 (4th ed. 1997). But see Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that delegation
should be nullified because it violated the Article I requirement of consensual gov-
ernment).
32.
[I]n the very nature of things, one person may not be intrusted with the
power to regulate the business of another, and especially of a competitor.
And a statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an intol-
erable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private
property. The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of
rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this court
which foreclose the question.
Carter, 298 U.S. at 311 (citing Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537); see also KOCH,
supra note 2, § 12.1317] (1997 & Supp. 1998).
33. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974)
(interpreting the Independent Offices Appropriations Act narrowly to avoid finding
excessive delegation).
34. Even before the New Deal, the Court had upheld broad delegations of power
accompanied by such standards. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1898) (permitting delegation accompanied by an "intelligible prin-
ciple" to guide agency).
514
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point all "Officers of the United States" with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and that "inferior Officers" be appointed
by the President, courts of law, or heads of departments. 5 The
President also retains supervisory authority to remove such
officers, if those officials owe duties that may be characterized as
essential to the discharge of the President's duties. 6 These offi-
cials must be removable at will in order for the President to
execute Article II powers. Nevertheless, though it is true that
the heads of executive agencies, such as cabinet departments,
serve at the pleasure of the President, the heads of independent
agencies, typically commissioners or board members, may be
removed only for "good cause," and may serve a fixed term.8
Congress has provided the terms for commissioners that range
between five and fourteen years.39
The creation of "independent" agencies has not been without
controversy. Many have argued that "independent" agencies are
unconstitutional because they exercise power without being
subject to presidential control.4" In Bowsher v. Synar,41 Chief
Justice Burger authored a draft opinion that would have held
that any agency officer charged with the execution of law must
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This clause has been interpreted to require
presidential appointment of any officeholder exercising significant lawmaking or ad-
ministrative authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-43 (1976).
36. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690-92 (1988) (holding that Independent
Counsel's discretion is not "so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as
to require . . . that the counsel be terminable at will by the President"); see also
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995) (reversing conviction reviewed by
court which included civilians not appointed in accordance with the Appointments
Clause).
37. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690-91.
38. See id. at 686-91 (noting that agency officials may be subject to removal only
for "good cause," so long as such restrictions do not interfere with the presidential
function of executing laws).
39. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLAM T. MAYTON, ADMmTRATivE LAW 604
n.4 (1993).
40. See Bernard Schwartz, An Administrative Law 'Might Have Been"-Chief Jus-
tice Burger's Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42 ADMIIN. L. REV. 221, 223 (1990) (summa-
rizing the arguments of those urging the unconstitutionality of independent commis-
sions).
41. 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (holding that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the
power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment").
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be subject to removal solely by the President.42 Certainly, this
could have led to a challenge to the constitutionality of indepen-
dent commissions. This same approach also has emerged in the
opinions of Justice Scalia, such as his dissent in Morrison v.
Olson.' According to Justice Scalia, the Constitution requires
that all executive power be vested in the President." This means
the President must have "exclusive" control over all "executive"
power.45 Notwithstanding these reservations, it now appears
well-settled that Congress may create agencies that are indepen-
dent of executive control to the extent the President may remove
its officers only for "good cause," so long as the removal restric-
tion does not "impede the President's ability to perform his con-
stitutional duty. 4 6 In fact, many Justices appear deeply commit-
ted to the institution of independent agencies.47 At oral argu-
ment in Bowsher, when the government accused the petitioners
of fear-mongering on the issue of the viability of independent
commissions, Justice O'Connor replied: "They scared me. 4 8 Over
the decades, independent commissions have endured challenge
after challenge on grounds similar to those asserted in Morri-
son.49 This leaves Congress with broad latitude to form agencies
with independence from the executive.
Congress also controls agencies through its control of appro-
priations. Nearly all agencies depend upon annual congressional
funding.5" There are some government-owned or government-
42. See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 232.
43. 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Synar v. United
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1403 (D.D.C. 1986) (Scalia, Johnson, Gasch, JJ.) (holding
that executive powers cannot be controlled by Congress).
44. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 691.
47. See generally Schwartz, supra note 40 (discussing the creation of independent
agencies).
48. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1986, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
117, 117 (1987).
49. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (holding that in the
absence of a provision giving the President the right to remove a member of the
War Claims Commission, a member may be removed only for cause); Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935) (upholding a provision limiting the
grounds for removal of FTC Commissioners to "inefficiency, neglect of duty or mal-
feasance").
50. See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 31, at 42-43.
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sponsored organizations that are not subject to presidential or
congressional budgetary review.51 These organizations, however,
are not generally regulatory agencies.52 Commentators maintain
that control over an agency's budget and appropriations renders
any distinction between independent agencies and executive
agencies meaningless.53 Naturally, an agency beholden to either
the executive or the legislature hardly can ignore the wishes of
the politicians or their influential constituents. Additionally,
members of Congress often attach limits on agency discretion to
appropriations bills.' Thus, any assessment of an agency's inde-
pendence must include an analysis of the degree to which it is
subject to the power of the purse.55 Given the importance of an
agency's financing in terms of its actual political independence,
it is surprising that most proposals for regulatory reform have
not focused on this element of an agency's legal structure.56
The legal structure of an agency is only part of the agency's
political independence. No matter how independent an agency
may appear based upon a cold legal analysis, ultimately the
political branches have the power to restructure the agency,
51. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET 16 (1995).
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory
Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252. Morrison argues that the difference between indepen-
dent agencies and executive agencies is "not substantial." Id. at 253. This conclusion
is based upon two suppositions: first, that an independent agency's budget is subject
to political review; and second, that the President appoints annually the Chair of
such agencies. See id. at 252. Neither of these conditions applies to the Federal
Reserve, which is not mentioned in Morrison's analysis.
54. See, e.g., DeAnne E. Parker, Backdoor Tactics to Forest Management: The
Emergency Salvage Timber Rider of H.R. 1944, 16 J. ENERGY NATIONAL RESOURCES
ENVYL. L. 216, 224 (1996) (noting that attaching substantive legislation to appropria-
tions bills putatively violates congressional rules). Congress has not hesitated to use
similar techniques in the area of financial regulation. See, e.g., Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (approving
SEC's budget for fiscal year 1999 and restricting investors' rights in private securi-
ties litigation).
55. One detailed study of the appropriations process demonstrated its powerful
effect upon agency action. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE:
APPROPRIATIONS POUTICS IN CONGRESS 219 (1966) ('Once the Committee's ability to
hurt it is recognized, the most obvious way for the agency to ensure a favorable
kind of relationship with the Committee is simply to do . . . what the Committee
tells it to do.").
56. See BREYER, supra note 12, at 59-72; Croley, supra note 20, at 168.
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abolish the agency or otherwise limit its independence. Indepen-
dence turns, therefore, not only upon the agency's structure, but
also upon the strength of presidential and congressional commit-
ment to its independence. Although it is true that Congress
creates administrative agencies in part to remove specified areas
of regulation from such pressures, this does not mean that all
agencies operate free from such pressures.57 Typically, regulato-
ry agencies are subject to a number of informal pressures from
Congress. 8 Congress can limit an agency's jurisdiction, cut off
its appropriations, or ruin a regulator's career. These levers
mean that Congress informally can curtail agency independence
even without legislating.59 Consequently, agencies are responsive
to congressional interests. Similarly, no agency would wish to
incur the wrath of the President. In short, political independence
depends upon political commitment to an agency's independence
which in turn is dependent upon traditional, bipartisan support
for the agency, its reputation, and the strength of the consensus
supporting independence.
Thus, the degree of political independence of an agency can be
determined by considering: (1) the breadth of its delegation; (2)
the extent to which its governing body can be removed by the
President; (3) the terms of the members of its governing body,
especially its Chair; (4) the method of funding the agency; and
(5) the degree to which the agency enjoys bipartisan, long-term
political commitment to its independence. This is a more com-
plete approach to agency independence than others that have
traditionally focused upon the President's removal power. This
multifactored assessment of political independence recognizes,
for example, that an agency with a broader delegation of power
is more insulated from judicial review and less prone to regula-
tory competition than an agency with narrower delegation. This
Article proceeds from the position that a multifactored approach
57. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 39, at 602-12 (describing the methods of
congressional oversight available).
58. See id.; see also Thomas Romer & Barry R. Weingast, Political- Foundations of
the Thrift Debacle, in POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE EIGHTIES 182 (Alberto
Alesina & Geoffrey Carliner eds., 1991) (describing the various forms of informal
pressures).
59. See Romer & Weingast, supra note 58, at 183-84.
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to independence provides a fuller explanation of agency action,
and serves as the foundation for determining the ability of an
agency to resist political pressure and special interest influence.
Why would Congress ever wish to create entities with law-
making authority that are beyond its direct control? The reasons
are both familiar and subtle. First, "delegations take lawmaking
out of a region of representative government and into a zone of
government by specialists presumed to act according to more dis-
interested and scientific judgments of good social policy."6" Sec-
ond, delegation to agencies "makes possible a greater range and
volume of lawmaking" through the administrative regulation
process.61 Third, Congress may seek to set up agencies specifically
designed to circumvent problems posed by excessive political
influence, either to stem the influence or to allow an agency to
resolve an issue mired in gridlock.62 Fourth, Congress may seek
to pass laws regulating specific areas but recognize that political
regulation may be unsaleable politically." Each of these factors
explains why Congress endows a given agency with a certain
degree of independence.64 In essence, the determination of the
degree of independence should turn upon congressional recogni-
tion of its own institutional limitations to govern regulation in a
given area.
Some commentators hypothesize that power is ceded when
legislators determine they can extract increased rents by divorc-
60. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 39, at 7.
61. Id.; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1988) (stating that
delegation is particularly appropriate for "intricate, labor-intensive task[s]"), affd, 873
F.2d 1446 (8th Cir. 1989).
62. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984).
63. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 239-40 (1989).
64. In a detailed study of independent agencies conducted in 1949, a commission
headed by former President Herbert Hoover (the Hoover Commission) stated that
independent agencies were "created not only to provide for the orderly dispatch of
complicated controversies by bodies deemed expert in their respective fields, but also
to eliminate abuses that had crept in and, at the same time, to promote an ade-
quate and healthy control." U.S. COMM'N ON THE ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE HOOVER COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExECU-
TIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 430 (1949) [hereinafter HOOVER COMMISSION RE-
PORT].
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ing power from Congress.65 Such a cynical view of congressional
behavior ignores the fact that administrative delegations seem
positively correlated to exogenous economic disruptions.66 The
possibility that Congress sometimes acts specifically out of a de-
sire to enact good policy should not be ignored completely.6
Congressional representatives, like humanity in general, are not
capable of always acting as "rational maximizers," but are capa-
ble of subjugating their immediate self-interest to a greater
good; in short, Congress can act in accordance with the public
interest.68 A more likely conclusion is that many different moti-
vations coalesce to cause Congress to part with power.6 9 Either
way, Congress does not tend to cede legislative power unless
there is a compelling case for doing so.
The original policy basis for independent agencies, therefore,
was that they would: (1) professionalize and provide expertise to
regulatory policy; (2) provide a stable and consistent basis for
regulatory continuity; (3) allow for constant regulatory adapta-
tion to changing conditions; and (4) eliminate the political influ-
ence of special interests.7 0 Beginning in 1887, with the formation
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and culminating in the
65. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (arguing that
legislation is supplied to those who pay the highest rents); Geoffrey P. Miller, An
Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998)
(arguing that legislators depoliticized monetary policy to extract higher rents from
contributors).
66. See, e.g., AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 39, at 2 (noting that the Great Depres-
sion accelerated the creation of agencies).
67. See WILSON, supra note 63, at 239 (suggesting that scholars who posit that
Congress always acts out of a desire to get re-elected would do well to ponder the
lengths to which Congress has gone to weaken its influence).
68. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 925 ("Wle were somewhat surprised
by the strong empirical evidence" showing that Congress can act in accordance with
the public interest); see also Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology
in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 279 (1984) (stating that
the view of "political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers" poorly predicts legis-
lative outcomes); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology and Logroll-
ing in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365, 384 (1979) (finding that ideology
influences congressional voting).
69. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 925 ("Although the public interest is
indeed a factor, so too are the efforts of numerous interest groups.").
70. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMIS-
SION 137-43 (1955).
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Progressive Movement of the early twentieth century and the
New Deal, Congress began minting independent agencies to
attack a wide array of ills. 1
By midcentury, however, commentators began to question
whether independent agencies could deliver upon their promises.
Moreover, there has been growing cynicism among scholars
about whether regulatory agencies can ever function in the pub-
lic interest. 72 These scholars have catalogued the sources of pres-
sure acting upon regulators that prevent agencies from vindi-
cating the public interest. One commentator has observed that
independence from the executive may isolate an agency from
sources of political strength within the executive branch, and
allow the agency to be molded into "a friendly protector of pri-
vate interests rather than an aggressive agent of the public
welfare,"7 3 and a means to provide "regulated groups with privi-
leged access to government."74 In other words, the regulated can
capture the regulators through the co-opting of career-minded or
budget-maximizing bureaucrats and fund-raising legislators
focused perpetually upon the next election.75 Similarly, Congress,
subject to re-election in biannual elections, is quite sensitive to
campaign contributions, other forms of campaign support, pa-
tronage, and even outright bribes.76 Congress, in turn, can exert
pressure over administrative agencies, which must appear before
Congress annually to obtain its budget approval.77 Commenta-
tors also have recognized the high degree of social pressure that
can be exerted upon regulatory agencies, ranging from prospec-
tive employment to social functions.78
By the 1970s, economists, political scientists, and legal schol-
ars were debating which theories best explained the domination
of regulation by special interests.79 More recently, scholars have
71. See id. at 13-71.
72. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
73. BERNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 266.
74. Id.
75. See Posner, supra note 3, at 337; Stigler, supra note 15, at 3.
76. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 182; Landes & Posner, supra note 65, at
877; Stigler, supra note 15, at 12-13.
77. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
78. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 211.
79. Compare Stigler, supra note 15, at 3 (articulating a theory of regulation gov-
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expanded the theory of capture beyond administrative agencies
to policy-making organs generally, and have de-emphasized the
role of "monied interests." They recognize instead the general
power of special interests to act as advocacy coalitions.80 Thus,
there has been a growing consensus over the years that regula-
tion is often highjacked, at least to some extent, from serving
the general public interest to serving special private interests.
81
Perhaps the question that should be posed is not whether so-
called independent agencies are subject to capture (they are),
but whether there exists a threshold of independence beyond
which an agency is highly resistant to capture.8 2
The Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) is an example of just
how politically independent an agency may be, particularly in
the area of monetary policy.8" Congress created the Fed pursu-
erned by supply and demand for regulation and therefore allocated in accordance
with the needs of special interests), with L. HARMON ZIEGLER & G. WAYNE PEAK,
INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1964) (articulating theory that over time
regulated interests dominate regulation).
80. See generally PAUL A. SA1ATIER & HANK C. JENKINs-SMrTH, POLICY CHANGE
AND LEARNING: AN ADVOCACY COALITION APPROACH 211-46 (1993) (analyzing an
advocacy coalition framework).
81. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 20, at 167 ("[Rlent-seekers' success requires much
more than providing legislators with political resources, and thus the exploitation of
the many by the few hardly appears a foregone conclusion. Instead, special-interest
domination seems more or less likely depending upon the procedural opportunities
available to other interests."); Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 925 ("The empiri-
cal evidence, however, clearly does not support a sanguine view of the legislative
process. Although the public interest is indeed a factor, so too are the efforts of
numerous interest groups. These interest groups threaten to push the political pro-
cess in the direction of a self-interested search for economic gain."); Posner, supra
note 3, at 356 (concluding that although empirical evidence is not strong, "the suc-
cess of economic theory in illuminating other areas of nonmarket behavior leads one
to be somewhat optimistic that the economic theory will eventually jell"); Stigler,
supra note 15, at 3 (articulating economic theory of regulation and concluding that
"[a] central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit").
82. Indeed, Professor Bernstein's landmark study of independent commissions spe-
cifically excluded the Federal Reserve Board. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 8
n.2.
83. In addition to acting as the nation's primary money supply regulator, the Fed
also regulates bank holding companies. In its capacity as a regulator of bank holding
companies, however, the Fed's authority is circumscribed because much banking
regulatory authority rests with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which
has authority over national banks. For a more detailed discussion of this regulatory
competition, see infra notes 440-66 and accompanying text.
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ant to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, $4 in the wake of the
catastrophic Panic of 1907. The Fed administers the Federal
Reserve System, 6 which is responsible for maintaining an "elas-
tic currency," acting as a lender of last resort for the banking
system and discounting commercial paper. 7 It is difficult to con-
ceive of an administrative agency with more power and more
political independence than the Fed.8" Indeed, the Fed has the
power to issue currency without limitation. 9 Although certain
agencies have enjoyed a high degree of political insulation at
times, rarely have agencies enjoyed a long-term consensus 'that
they should operate free of political influence. For example, the
Legal Services Corporation has alternated between being a polit-
ical punching bag and enjoying political insulation.0
The Fed enjoys both a depoliticized structure and a long-term
commitment from the political branches to its continued inde-
pendence.91 The President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, appoints Fed members to fourteen-year terms and they
84. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1994 &
Supp. 1996)).
85. Noted economists have recognized the importance of the Panic of 1907 in
bringing about the Federal Reserve Act. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOB-
SON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960, at 138,
156-63 (1963). The Panic of 1907 resulted from the failure of a major New York
Bank, which triggered a series of cascading bank failures. See id.
86. The Board does so by setting reserve requirements, governing the discount
window and controlling the Federal Open Market Committee. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 248,
263 (1994).
87. See Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (establishing the Federal Reserve
System and enumerating its powers and duties).
88. See generally THIBAUT DE SAINT PHALLE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 56 (1985)
(stating that the Fed's power has greatly increased since its creation in 1913); Alfred
C. Aman, Jr., Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Con-
ditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 845-51 (1989) (describing
the structure and leadership of the Fed).
89. See 12 U.S.C. § 248(d) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
90. See generally Charles J. Cooper & Michael A. Carvin, The Price of "Political
Independence"." The Unconstitutional Status of the Legal Services Corporation, 4 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 13-16 (1994) (recounting instances of presidential and congressio-
nal tampering with the basic mission of the Legal Services Corporation).
91. See WILLuiM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL RESERVE
RUNS THE COUNTRY 12 (1987) ("The Federal Reserve System was the crucial anoma-
ly at the very core of representative democracy, an uncomfortable contradiction with
the civic mythology of self-government. Yet the American system accepted the incon-
sistency. The community of elected politicians acquiesced to its power.").
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are removable only for cause.92 The chairman of the Fed is ap-
pointed for a four-year term.9 3 The Fed members' terms are
staggered so that one of the seven members' terms expires every
two years.94 Thus, a president who serves only a single term
may have only two members they may appoint. The length of
terms for both Fed members and the chairman are the longest
terms enjoyed by any agency.9 5 The Fed governors also enjoy
competitive salaries for public servants; as of 1994, governors
earned $123,100 annually and the chairman earned $133,600
annually.96 In addition, governors are prohibited from serving in
the banking industry for two years after exiting the Fed if they
fail to complete their entire fourteen-year term. All of this
means that the Fed is the beneficiary of a high degree of struc-
tural independence.
Originally, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller
of the Currency, both executive officers, served on the Fed, but
the Banking Act of 193598 terminated their membership.99 The
Banking Act of 1935 also increased the tenure of the Fed gover-
nors from twelve to fourteen years, 100 and centralized further the
control of monetary policy in the Board.'0  The purpose of the
Banking Act was to endow the Fed with more political insula-
tion so that it could exercise its control over monetary policy in a
way that represented the "general public interest" and did not
operate in accordance with "a majority of special interests."0 2
The Banking Act was an essential part of President Roosevelt's
economic recovery plan and he intervened personally to assure
its passage. 0 3 The Banking Act represents the commencement of
the Fed's modern existence in that the Banking Act definitively
92. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242.
93. See id. § 242.
94. See id.
95. See supra notes 39, 53 and accompanying text.
96. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 5313-5314 (1994).
97. See 12 U.S.C. § 242.
98. Ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1994)).
99. See 12 U.S.C. § 241.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 263.
102. H.R. REP. No. 74-742, at 1, 6 (1935).
103. See WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 44-45.
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vested monetary policy in the Fed and assured that it was en-
dowed with a high degree of independence.
The Fed is also remarkably independent of the appropriations
process. The Fed has the power to assess member banks to sup-
ply funds for its operating expenses.1°4 In 1933 Congress de-
clared these funds not to be "[glovernment funds or appropriated
moneys."" 5 As a result, the expenditure of these funds is essen-
tially free of congressional oversight.' Similarly, the Fed has
the power to determine freely the compensation of its employees
without being restricted by government service pay scales.07 All
of this insulation from political influence has prompted Professor
Aman to state that the Fed is "one of the most powerful and
independent federal agencies engaged in economic regulation."0 8
This may be somewhat of an understatement; the Fed is the
only regulatory agency that is totally self-funded and free from
the appropriations process.10 9 Occasionally the Fed has been
subject to government budgetary oversight and audit, but the
general rule is that it need not annually submit its budget to
Congress for approval. 10
The Fed is required to make certain reports regarding its
activities, including an annual report of its operations to the
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 243.
105. Id. § 244.
106. See generally id. §§ 243-244 (granting to the Fed the power to decide how to
spend the money collected from member banks).
107. See id. § 244.
108. Aman, supra note 88, at 838-39; see also JOHN T. WOOLLEY, MONETARY POLI-
TICS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE POLITICS OF MONETARY POLICY 1 (1984)
("Among powerful governmental institutions, the Federal Reserve is surely in the
first rank.").
109. Cf. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., BUDGET OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999 app. 1165 (1998) (stating that the Fed's
operations are not included in the budget and its budget is not reviewed by the
President).
110. See 12 U.S.C. § 244. The Government Accounting Office has reviewed the
Federal Reserve's operations. See Fed Chief Takes Exception to GAO's Critical Re-
port, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1996, at C22 (reporting Chairman Greenspan's response
to GAO report finding that the Fed suffered from lax internal controls); see also U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: INTERNAL CONTROL, ACCOUNT-
ING, AND AUDITING ISSUES (1996) (reporting the results of a GAO audit of the Dallas
Federal Reserve Bank); John R. Wilke, Showing Its Age: Fed's Huge Empire, Set Up
Years Ago, Is Costly and Inefficient, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1996, at Al (summariz-
ing the GAO's findings of budgetary excesses at the Fed).
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Speaker of the House.' The Fed also must report every sixty
months to Congress on the availability of credit to small busi-
nesses." The Fed must keep records of its determinations re-
garding monetary policy and must disclose these records to Con-
gress." The most celebrated Fed disclosure is the Chairman's
semiannual testimony on economic conditions pursuant to the
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978."4 Although
these reporting requirements may well increase the political
accountability of the Fed, they hardly represent a substantial
check upon the Fed's control of monetary policy.
The Fed also has been delegated broad, almost unlimited,
power over monetary policy." 5 The Fed has three tools giving it
tight control over the nation's money supply. It has great influ-
ence over short-term interest rates by virtue of its control over
the discount rate16 and the federal funds rate." The discount
rate is the interest rate the Fed charges depository institutions
that wish to borrow from it; consequently the Fed directly influ-
ences the cost of money for a depository institution."' The Fed
also has the power to accelerate or decelerate the money creat-
ing credit process of the commercial banking industry due to its
control over reserve requirements." 9 The Fed also controls the
Federal Open Market Committee which expands or contracts the
money supply by buying or selling government bonds. 2 ° With its
111. See 12 U.S.C. § 247.
112. See id. § 252 (Supp. 1997).
113. See id. § 2479(a).
114. Humphrey Hawkins Full Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 225a (1994)).
115. As Thiebaut de Saint Phalle has observed: "Very few of us realize the extent
to which all of us are dependent upon the decisions ... of the Federal Reserve
Board." DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at xvii. Because of their control of mone-
tary policy, the Fed's decisions determine "whether our economy grows; whether
inflation reduces our standard of living; whether the interest rates on our mortgages
rise; perhaps even whether our jobs exist." Id
116. See 12 U.S.C. § 357.
117. See id. § 347.
118. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 12.
119. See 12 U.S.C. § 461.
120. See id. §§ 263, 355; see also DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 11 ("Put in
simple terms, the [Fed] can increase the money supply by buying government securi-
ties . . . and decrease the money supply by selling government securities."). Techni-
cally, the open market operations are conducted under the authority of the Federal
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tight control over the money supply, the Fed may well be the
most powerful economic actor, domestically and internationally.
In the last few decades, economists have increasingly recog-
nized the dominance of monetary policy in influencing economic
output.'" The guidance from Congress on the goals the Fed
should achieve in administering monetary policy are so general
as to be essentially devoid of meaning in practice, requiring the
Fed to maximize output and maintain price stability.122 Econo-
mists generally have recognized that the Fed is so powerful that
its policies can dictate whether the general economy expands or
contracts.' In other words, the Fed can induce recessions that
cut incomes and cost jobs or induce economic expansions that
increase incomes and employment.' Increasingly, the Fed not
only holds sway over domestic economic conditions, but also over
global economic conditions." Thus, the Fed has been endowed
with both vast powers and the highest degree of political insula-
tion.
Of course, political independence explains only a part of an
agency's accountability. The judiciary reviews a wide array of
Open Market Committee. See 12 U.S.C. § 263. The Federal Open Market Committee
directs Federal Reserve banks, located throughout the country, to actually implement
open market operations. See i& § 355. The Committee consists of all seven gover-
nors of the Fed, plus five representatives of the Federal Reserve banks. See id. §
263. The Fed essentially controls the Federal Reserve banks. See generally 12 U.S.C.
§§ 248(f), (j), 302, 305, 341 (authorizing the Fed to control the composition and ac-
tivities of member banks).
121.
The monetarist proposition that monetary changes are responsible for
business cycles was [initially] widely contested, but by the end of the
1960s the view that monetary policy had important effects on aggregate
activity was generally accepted. The obvious importance of monetary
growth in the inflation of the 1970s restored money to the centre of
macroeconomics.
Phillip Cagan, Monetarism, in THE NEW PALGRAVE, THE WORLD OF ECONOMICS 449,
451 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1991); see also FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 85,
at 686-95 (describing actions taken by the Federal Reserve System that resulted in
changes in output).
122. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a.
123. See FRIEDMAN & SCHVARTZ, supra note 85, at 687-91.
124. See id.
125. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at xxiii ("The actions of the Federal Re-
serve Board determine whether the global economy will function in an inflationary
or a deflationary cycle.... ").
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agency decisions. The judiciary will not allow agencies to take
action that is contrary to their governing statutes. The courts
also will ensure that agencies adhere to concepts of due process.
Within these broad limitations agencies largely operate with
little judicial interference. 12 6 Indeed, certain areas of agency ac-
tion essentially are nonreviewable because of prudential limita-
tions the judiciary has imposed upon itself, such as standing
limitations.12 For example, the Fed's power over monetary poli-
cy probably is not reviewable because these decisions are com-
mitted to the agency's discretion2 8 and it is unlikely that any par-
ticular person could establish any statutory "core of interests"
intended for protection. 9 The courts thus far have refused to
extend jurisdiction to any purported victim of the Fed's policy.30
Similarly, the Fed has exempted itself from the rule-making
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)... with
regard to its control over monetary policy.13 2 With its very broad
delegation, the Fed operates virtually free of judicial restraint in
conducting monetary policy.'33
In the final analysis, the Fed is only as independent of politi-
cal influence as the politicians permit."M The Fed enjoys the
126. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (holding that reasonable agency determinations will be upheld).
127. See id. at 844.
128. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (holding that the Indian Health
Service's decision to discontinue a program was not subject to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that
a decision by the Food and Drug Administration was not subject to review under
the Administrative Procedure Act).
129. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) (setting forth the "legal interest" test plaintiffs must satisfy to sue an agency).
130. See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(affirming the district court's dismissal of the Senator's cause of action on the basis
of its equitable discretion); Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Bd., 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that members of a
group of private interests harmed by monetary policy lacked standing to challenge
Fed action or structure); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that
a Congressman lacked standing to challenge the composition of the Federal Open
Market Committee of the Fed).
131. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
132. See 12 C.F.R. § 272.5 (1999) (embodying the Fed's determination that it is in
the public interest for the Fed to set monetary policy free from strictures of the
APA).
133. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
134. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 77 ("While the Fed is independent
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highest degree of commitment to its political independence.
Presidents from Eisenhower"3 5 to Carter have publicly affirmed
their commitment to the Fed's independence.3 6 The current
administration is also committed to the Fed's continued indepen-
dence. 3 7 Treasury secretaries have defended the independence of
the Fed.18 The Fed is aware that Congress can revoke its inde-
pendence or narrow its powers at any time. Consequently, the
Fed exercises its independence with a sensitivity to this ultimate
vulnerability. The Fed is particularly vulnerable because of its
vast power and its perceived lack of accountability.' Neverthe-
less, Congress has neither the incentive nor the institutional
capability for monitoring the Fed. Monetary policy is too compli-
cated and risky to encourage congressional interference with the
Fed.14
Over the years, the Fed appears to have acted, at times, to foil
political initiatives when economic policy so demanded." Still,
from direct control, either by the administration or Congress, it was created by Con-
gress, and the Fed is fully aware that Congress can at any time change its man-
date, responsibilities, or powers.").
135. See id. at 76 ("[The Fed] is not under the authority of the President and I
personally believe it to be a mistake to make it definitely and directly responsible to
the political head of state.'" (quoting President Eisenhower)).
136. GREIDER, supra note 91, at 152 ("As you well know, I don't have control over
the Fed, none at all. It's carefully isolated from any influence by the President or
the Congress. This has been done for many generations and I think it's a wise thing
to do.") (quoting President Carter)).
137. See Clinton and Greenspan: The Odd Couple, BUS. Wk., July 14, 1997, at 48
[hereinafter The Odd Couple] (quoting President Clinton attributing good relations
with the Fed to the administration's defense of Fed independence); Dean Foust, Alan
Greenspan's Brave New World, BUS. WK., July 14, 1997, at 44 (stating that the
Treasury Secretary does not second-guess Fed policy).
138. See, e.g., Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy 'Discussion Princi-
ples": Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation and Ins.
of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Hous., 94th Cong. 597, 604 (1976)
(statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stephen Gardner); The Federal Reserve
System After Fifty Years: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Fin. of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong. 1231-32 (1964) (statement of
Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillion).
139. See supra note 91.
140. Senator William Proxmire explained the reasons for Congress's "extremely
thin" oversight of the Fed in an interview with Professor Woolley. See WOOLLEY, su-
pra note 108, at 137.
141. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 76. The next Part of this Article
assesses some of the more significant instances of unpopular Fed policy initiatives.
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the Fed has also taken great pains to avoid influencing elec-
tions.142 As a consequence, the Fed has avoided any significant
political initiative to constrain its power or restrict its indepen-
dence. The Fed's success at this balancing act has served as a
major prop to its independence. Another prop to Fed indepen-
dence is the financial community's belief that Fed independence
is crucial to a sound currency and emblematic of the
government's commitment to fighting inflation.' In the area of
financial market regulation, the Fed has achieved a remarkable
level of political independence.' 4 A key element of the Fed's
independence, both as a matter of legal structure and political
commitment, is the strength of the policy basis of its indepen-
dence.' 45
The reasons why Congress created the Fed and endowed it
with such extraordinary independence and power seem clear.
The primary reason given for the Federal Reserve Act of 1913
was to "furnish an elastic currency."' Although modern eco-
nomic theory associates money supply manipulation to monetary
policy, in 1913 an "elastic currency" referred to a more basic
economic need.'47 Specifically, Congress was far more concerned
with "seasonal" currency needs and the mobility of reserves (or
liquidity) to meet the cyclical agricultural demand for money.'
See infra notes 197-300 and accompanying text.
142. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 125-30 (studying the conduct of monetary
policy in election years and concluding that the Fed tries to "lie low").
143. For example, Professor Woolley reported that in the 1980s, when the Reagan
Administration threatened to curtail Fed independence, the Reagan Administration
retreated based upon the sentiments of the financial community. See WOOLLEY, su-
pra note 108, at 118; see also Fears for Trade and the Fed, Too, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1990, § 3, at 4 (reporting that Wall Street supports the political independence of
the Fed). But see Sheri Berman & Kathleen R. McNamara, Bank on Democracy: Why
Central Banks Need Public Oversight, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 2 (arguing
that central banks need democratic control).
144. See generally The Odd Couple, supra note 137, at 48.
145. Contemporary financial observers have recognized the importance of political
commitment to central bank independence. See, e.g., Central Banks: America v. Ja-
pan: The Rewards of Independence, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1992, at 19 (observing that
even though the Fed has superior legal independence when compared to the Bank of
Japan, the Japanese central bank enjoys a greater political commitment to fighting
inflation).
146. H.R. REP. No. 63-69, at 1 (1913).
147. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 85, at 189-96.
148. See H.R. REP. NO. 63-69, at 5; see also FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 85,
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These seasonal disruptions in currency demand caused panics
and bank runs that, in turn, triggered severe economic contrac-
tions in 1907, 1896, 1893, 1890, 1884, and 1873.149 These panics
had increased the saliency of banking law reform in the public's
political consciousness. The Democratic Party, for example, in-
cluded a provision in its 1912 platform for banking law reform
designed to relieve currency shortages. 150 By the time of the
passage of the Banking Act of 1935, Congress explicitly under-
stood the relationship between money supply and output, and
reconceived the Fed's role from mere currency "accommodation"
to protector of "business stability." 1' The independence Congress
extended to the Fed must be viewed as a recognition of the dan-
gers of political influence over monetary policy. Commentators
have long demonstrated that politicians face an irresistible urge
to inflate currencies for political gain.
152
Even though the full impact of the Fed's control of monetary
policy as a means of determining macroeconomic output was not
fully appreciated in 1913, the power granted to the Fed was still
vast. The Fed could print money. 5 In 1913, the backing of the
currency was a hot political issue;" thus, the granting of this
power to the Fed demonstrates that Congress consciously under-
stood that the "independent" agency it was creating would wield
tremendous power.'55 Yet, Congress still endowed the Fed with
tremendous independence. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 is
nothing less than a reaffirmation of the suspicions of unbridled
democracy that lie at the foundation of our constitutional sys-
tem. In the context of the power to create money, the 1913 Act
at 192-93 (discussing the need for "some form of currency that could be rapidly
expanded ... and some means of enabling banks to convert their assets into such
currency").
149. See H.R. REP. No. 63-69, at 4.
150. See id. at 7-8.
151. H.R. REP. No. 74-742, at 9 (1935).
152. See generally Miller, supra note 65, at 436-45 (discussing the rent-extraction
motivation for inflation).
153. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 11, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amend-
ed at 12 U.S.C. § 248(d) (1994)) (giving the Fed the power to issue Federal Reserve
Notes).
154. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 35-39.
155. See id. at 39-40.
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evinces a deep-seated suspicion that invariably politicians would
manipulate the money supply and debase the currency in an
effort to assure re-election. Simply put, Congress decided that
the political process could not be trusted with the power to print
money in a modern economy.'56 Consequently, the Fed was, as
Senator Carter Glass, a chief sponsor of the Act, stated during
the Act's debates, "'to be wholly divorced from politics.'" 57 This
desire for depoliticizing monetary policy reflects the strength of
the policy basis of the Fed, and hence the strength of the politi-
cal commitment to its independence.
The independence of the Fed should be contrasted with the
"independence" of other financial regulators. 158 For example, the
SEC is governed by a regulatory commission, which is appointed
by the President for five-year terms and must have a bipartisan
composition. 9 Nevertheless, SEC commissioners serve at the
pleasure of the President. 6 ° Moreover, the SEC is not funded
independently and must go to Congress for its annual appro-
priation.' 6 ' Consequently, the SEC has been subject to signif-
icant legislative incursions upon matters that were putatively
left to its discretion. For example, Congress occasionally has
pressured the SEC to alter its disclosure rules.'62 Recently, Con-
156. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 267. Internationally and historically, the fear
of a democratically controlled money supply is at the heart of arguments in favor of
central bank independence. See ROSE MARIA LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANK-
ING REGULATION 13 (1996). Empirical evidence suggests that the theoretical rationale
for central bank independence is well supported. See id. at 15-18.
157. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 281 (quoting Sen. Glass).
158. Many commentators have assessed the degree of independence enjoyed by
central banks. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 65, at 446 n.25. No commentator, howev-
er, has translated the essential elements of central bank independence into factors
that can be used to understand agency independence generally. See generally
LASTRA, supra note 156, at 10-60 (providing a detailed overview of the elements of
independence, in the context of various central banks, and concluding that central
bank independence is a useful means of achieving stable money and a sound curren-
cy). Notably, these assessments of central bank independence generally conclude that
the Fed has long been one of the few independent central banks in the world. See
id. at 1.
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994).
160. See id.
161. See id. § 78kk.
162. See STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE YEAR 2000 TECH. PROBLEM,
106TH CONG., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF THE YEAR 2000 PROBLEM 14, 79-92
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gress also invaded the SEC's discretion to define securities
fraud. 163 Indeed, in the 1999 appropriation bill funding the SEC,
Congress included a significant amendment to the securities
laws: specifically, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 (the Uniform Act).' Traditionally, the federal secu-
rities laws provided remedies to investors that were cumulative
of state law remedies.165 This meant that the federal securities
laws could only operate to extend increased protection to inves-
tors. The Uniform Act, however, preempts state law with regard
to securities litigation involving publicly traded companies. Com-
bined with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA),'66 the Uniform Act means that the federal securities
laws now operate to restrict investor remedies only.167 Initially,
the SEC did not support the Uniform Act.168 Those who argue
that all protective regulation is turned invariably to the advan-
tage of the regulated would not be surprised with this result.'69
(1999) (summarizing congressional pressure on the SEC to improve disclosure rules
regarding disclosure of the year 2000 technology problem and costs that businesses
would absorb).
163. The SEC has retained discretion to define most securities fraud since its cre-
ation pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j. In 1995,
Congress undertook the first major initiative to redefine securities fraud, pursuant to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. This initiative will be analyzed
in detail below. See infra notes 343-64 and accompanying text.
164. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
165. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb.
166. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
167. See Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous,
and Now Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Actions, 65 U. CIN.
L. REV. 3, 40-41 (1996) (stating that the protection of federal law has been de-
stroyed).
168. See Rachel Witmer, Gramm, Domenici, Dodd Introduce Bill to Federalize Secu-
rities Class Actions, 66 U.S.L.W. 2220 (Oct. 14, 1997). The SEC ultimately gave con-
ditional support to the Uniform Act, even though its own studies showed that any
such legislation was "premature." Sec. Litig. Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 10-13
(1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
169. There is strong evidence that many innovative regulatory reforms from the
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century ultimately benefitted the powerful
interests that were supposedly the target of regulation. Gabriel Kolko has under-
taken exhaustive research showing that business leaders in industries subject to
such reforms welcomed government regulation and dominated "progressive" reforms.
See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 3 (1963).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The New Dealers who led the charge to federalize investor pro-
tection would be horrified.
170
Even if agencies like the SEC enjoyed the same structural and
institutional independence as the Fed, they would remain vul-
nerable to capture because their power is highly fragmented. For
example, regulatory experts recognized as early as 1949 that the
fact that regulatory power was splintered among numerous
federal agencies and shared with each of the states undermined
the federal program of bank regulation. 7' The Hoover Commis-
sion recognized that this allowed banks to play supervisory au-
thorities against each other and that banks could escape regula-
tory mandates by choosing their regulator.7 2 Consequently,
these agencies do not have the same ability to make decisions
free of political influence. They must pay heed to the regulated
or lose the ability to exercise significant regulatory power. When
a regulated industry has the ability to choose their regulator, a
giant channel towards capture is opened. There is no similar
regulatory competition in the area of regulating monetary policy.
Thus, except for the Fed's control of monetary policy, financial
regulation is prone to the same shortcomings of politicized regu-
lation that are pervasive in the modern regulatory state.
173
Recently, scholars in the area of administrative regulation, led
by Justice Stephen Breyer, have argued that depoliticization of
administrative regulation can be used to address problems in-
herent in the regulatory process. 74 Justice Breyer argues that
170. One visionary was Ferdinand Pecora. Pecora served for 17 months, from Janu-
ary, 1933 to July, 1934 as counsel to the Senate Committee on Banking and Curren-
cy, during the time of the hearings, on the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. See FERDINAND
PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 3 (Reprints of Economic Classics ed. 1968)
(1939). Pecora published a summary of those congressional hearings because "[a]fter
five short years, we may now need to be reminded what Wall Street was like before
Uncle Sam stationed a policeman at its comer... Id. at xi. Pecora predicted that
the public would forget the hazards of a deregulated financial system. See id. at ix-x.
171. See HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, app. N at 116.
172. See id.
173. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 12. Other than Justice Breyer's approach, com-
mentators have had surprisingly little to say about remedying the shortcomings of
administrative regulation.
Up to now, most regulatory scholars resisting the public choice theory's
calls for deregulation have instead taken a very different track, turning
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three fundamental problems infect agency regulation. First, the
public is subject to various forms of cognitive dissonance which
results in a failure to rationally weigh costs and benefits of vari-
ous regulatory programs.175 It would not surprise anyone, for
example, that ordinary citizens, preoccupied with family obliga-
tions, social relationships, full-time employment, financial chal-
lenges, saving for retirement and college, and faced with a vast
array of information and intellectual attractions, ranging from
the existence and meaning of black holes to whether the Presi-
dent had sex with a young intern, may not always have the time
or resources to determine which environmental risks, for exam-
ple, are the greatest.7 6 Second, Congress, in responding to politi-
cal pressures, necessarily transmits poor public perception, com-
bined with its own institutional infirmities, into law.1 7 Breyer
highlights the fact that Congress enacts one statute at a time
and often fails to look at problems in a unified fashion across
overlapping committee jurisdictions. 17  Third, administrative
agencies, necessarily acting in an environment of great uncer-
tainty, and with competing agendas and constituencies, often
take inconsistent approaches to similar problems, resulting in
uncoordinated regulation. 79 This vicious circle creates misregu-
lation plagued by tunnel vision, irrational agendas, and incon-
to courts as the ultimate safeguard against the danger of rent-seeking.
While that approach is sensible enough, especially given that judges are
relatively insulated from the types of political pressures that produce
undesirable regulations, there is no reason to place such a heavy burden
on courts alone. Nor can it be clear just what oversight role is most
appropriate for the courts, absent deeper understanding of exactly what
they are overseeing. Between delegation and judicial review lies the black
box of administrative process. Reformers who would preserve the regula-
tory regime should open it.
Croley, supra note 20, at 168; see also Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Ana-
lyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMN. L. REV. 377, 398 (1997) (proposing a model
of regulation that focuses on the roles of policy, politics, and law, and urging schol-
ars to improve regulation through a iffler understanding of the context in which it
operates and its goals).
175. See BREYER, supra note 12, at 33-39.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 39-42.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 42-50.
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sistency.8 ° In short, Justice Breyer has identified a series of
malfunctions in agency regulation generally that are not dis-
similar to the problems that other scholars contend generally
plague regulation-all resulting from too much political influ-
ence in the agency process.' 8 '
Justice Breyer's articulation of the problems of regulation
focuses on issues endemic to environmental risk regulation. The
scope of his solution is, however, without any such limitation.
Justice Breyer posits that "[a] depoliticized regulatory process
might produce better results."182 Breyer argues for the creation
of a group with interagency jurisdiction and political insulation
to coordinate and rationalize regulation. 183 This group would
have authority to impose its decisions and would have the power
to build a coherent risk-regulating system adaptable across
agencies. 4 These "superregulators" would be chosen from a
specific career path that would add their expertise to regulation
and be given civil service protection. 8 ' The career path would
require service in Congress, the Office of Management and Bud-
get, and administrative agencies.8 6
Certainly, Justice Breyer's proposal has generated criticism.
87
Not the least of these is that such a proposal tends toward an un-
democratic, elitist government.'88 Critics have already launched
180. See id. at 50.
181. See id. at 50-51. A more expansive discussion of Justice Breyer's diagnosis
focuses on the institutional infirmities plaguing regulatory agencies and Congress.
See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1-11 (1982). The common
themes of political salience, complexity, inappropriate political influence, institutional
infirmity, and fragmentation appear to form the basis of each diagnosis of the prob-
lems of government regulation.
182. BREYER, supra note 12, at 55-56.
183. See id. at 59-72, 80-81.
184. See id. at 60-61.
185. See id. at 59-61, 67-68.
186. See id. at 59-60.
187. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a
Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 365, 385 (1994) (arguing that Justice Breyer
"does not pay sufficient attention to the role of interest groups" in assessing regula-
tory efficacy).
188. See Eric J. Gouvin, A Square Peg in a Vicious Circle: Stephen Breyer's Opti-
mistic Prescription for the Regulatory Mess, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 487 (1995)
(stating that Breyer should have responded to arguments that "Congress has already
delegated too much authority to agencies without sufficient accountability").
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such attacks upon the current regulatory structure, even with-
out a group of superregulators with civil service protection and
insulation."9 No doubt, these critics are correct that depoliticiz-
ing regulation and delegating power to administrative agencies
lessens democratic influence, often over important areas of our
society. Nevertheless, in appropriate circumstances such
depoliticization and delegation is both consistent with, and sup-
portive of, the American republican tradition. Specifically, Amer-
ican government has always been designed both to limit and to
accommodate democratic influences.' From the beginning of the
Republic, certain issues were not a matter of politics. The
Founders specifically contemplated a depoliticized system of
legal regulation.' 9 ' Thus, the President serves a four-year term,
subject only to the drastic remedy of impeachment, and Senators
serve six-year terms.' 92 Article III judges enjoy tenure during
"good behavior."'93 American citizens, in fact, elect leaders; so
long as these leaders are accountable to voters for all of their
policy decisions, including their supervision of agencies, delega-
tion cannot be termed antidemocratic, in any traditional
sense.'94 Thus, the question really should be not whether Justice
189. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 196 (1993) (stating that the delegation of
power to agencies reduces popular participation in lawmaking). Professor Schoenbrod
launches the broadest possible attack on administrative regulation: that delegation to
administrative agencies of legislative and executive power is unconstitutional and
antidemocratic. See id. at 20-21. This Article posits that the increased complexity of
our society mandates broad delegations to administrative agencies. To argue that
Congress is capable, for example, of administering monetary policy is to ignore the
reality of such complexity. See id. at 13.
190. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 127 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) ("[I]t may be concluded, that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society
consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the govern-
ment in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction."); Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522 (1990) ("If the
Constitution's Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a bizarre
manner of demonstrating their affection.").
191. See Eule, supra note 190, at 1525.
192. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; id& art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 4.
193. See id. at art. Ill.
194. Issues of agency independence necessarily implicate issues of agency ac-
countability. Nevertheless, an optimal tradeoff in these values can be achieved, and
noted commentators in the area of financial regulation have recognized that central
bank independence can accommodate such an optimal tradeoff. See LASTRA, supra
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Breyer's proposal for depoliticization is undemocratic, but
whether broader depoliticization is possible without the constitu-
tionally dubious excesses of Justice Breyer's proposal. This Arti-
cle responds affirmatively to that inquiry.
As society has become more complex, and many legal issues
consequently demand a higher degree of expertise, the ability of
the electorate to make informed decisions is compromised. Rapid
evolution in specific areas of legal regulation compromises the
ability of even a republican form of government to respond. Po-
litical scientists as well as legal scholars have recognized the
pernicious effects upon sound regulation that follow from these
realities.195 Under these circumstances, placing issues of low
political saliency before a traditional regulatory agency can in-
vite special interests to obtain regulatory largess. Congress, on
the other hand, often lacks sufficient institutional expertise and
flexibility to manage certain areas of government activities.'96
Moreover, Congress itself is often prone to distributing largess.
With these realities in mind, the next Part demonstrates that
circumstances can exist to render depoliticized regulation, in
accordance with the Constitution, an effective means to support
our democratic government-by taking areas of low political
visibility, and shedding the light of uncorrupted expertise upon
them.
II. AN ASSESSMENT OF DEPOLITICIZED REGULATION
This Part assesses the success of depoliticized regulation, with
a specific focus on the Fed. As demonstrated above, the Fed is
endowed with a high degree of independence from the political
process. 97 The emphasis of this Part is an attempt to determine
note 156, at 20-24; see also Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Con-
stitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 565 (1998) ("Indications from the time surrounding
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution suggest that ... the view of ac-
countability that the founding community held . . . is a view of accountability as a
notion of blame.").
195. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 189, at 119-21 (highlighting how the lack of
congressional expertise results in delegation to agencies that also suffer from politi-
cal pressures when deciding how to regulate).
196. See id.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 83-97.
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whether depoliticized regulation delivers upon its promise of a
sounder basis for regulation. This discussion does not focus on
the Fed's use of this power and independence to discharge its
economic objectives.' 98 Economists have long debated, for exam-
ple, whether the Fed should focus on setting economic aggre-
gates, interest rates or money stocks, and politicians have debat-
ed the relative value of stemming unemployment or inflation. 99
Instead, this discussion focuses on the success of the Fed in
conducting monetary policy free of political influence. This Part
also assesses whether the putative benefits of depoliticization
have been realized.
The Fed's authority over monetary policy is somewhat acci-
dental."'° After the Panic of 1907, many believed that an elastic
currency was needed to stem bank runs and provide liquidity for
198. As has been discussed, one bedrock belief that justifies the independence of
the Fed is that political control of the money supply is undesirable because politi-
cians will be tempted to stimulate the economy with easy money in order to en-
hance their ability to get re-elected. The empirical evidence suggests that central
bank independence, such as that enjoyed by the Fed, does serve to mitigate infla-
tion. See LASTRA, supra note 156, at 15-18. But see Berman & McNamara, supra
note 143, at 4 (arguing that although there is some evidence that central bank inde-
pendence leads to lower inflation, there is no convincing evidence that it contributes
to real economic performance).
199. Compare FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 85, at 676 (concluding that
changes in money stock determine changes in economic activity), with James Tobin,
Monetary Policy: Rules, Targets and Shocks, 15 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 506,
517 (1983) (arguing that "for periods long enough for velocity shocks to be identified
and offset, a nominal GNP or final sales target is much preferable to any intermedi-
ate monetary aggregate"). Congress half-heartedly entered this debate in 1975. See
H.R. Con. Res. 133, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted). This resolution required the Fed to
target monetary aggregates and attempt to lower interest rates. See id. Congress,
however, gave the Fed explicit authority to deviate from its announced targets. See
H.R. REP. No. 94-91, at 4 (1975) (explaining that the Fed can deviate from the reso-
lution if it deems the announced targets unachievable). Because this resolution was
the culmination of a legislative initiative to impose real restraints upon the Fed, at
a time when the Fed was quite vulnerable politically, this instance of legislative
activity shows just how politically independent the Fed is. See, e.g., WOOLLEY, supra
note 108, at 144-47 (stating that "HCR 133 was toothless").
200. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 282 (stating that it was assumed during the
Federal Reserve debates that the gold standard would continue to stabilize the value
of money); WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 40-41 ("The founders of the Federal Reserve
System assumed that the gold system and the real bills doctrine provided objective
and appropriate criteria for regulating the money supply.").
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the financial system.20' Certainly, the Fed has power over the
nation's money supply, °2 but this was not the main point of the
Act.203 The link between aggregate output and monetary policy
was not fully understood in 1913; indeed, it was not until after
World War II that monetary policy was fully appreciated.204 At
the time of the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed actually was con-
sidered a "collection of supercorrespondent banks," rather than a
key economic policymaker. °5 There is no mention in the legisla-
tive reports accompanying the Act of the Fed's responsibility for
monetary policy and, similarly, no mention of the Fed having
the power to determine output, prices, and growth." 6 Congress
did not predict in 1913 just how powerful its creature would be-
come.0 ' Nevertheless, Congress did knowingly endow the Fed
with unparalleled power and independence. °8 The Banking Act
of 1935, and to a lesser extent other New Deal adjustments to
the nation's regulatory structure, represents a conscious decision
by lawmakers to expand the Fed's power and independence.0 9
Congress took these steps at a time when issues of financial
reform were at the forefront of public debate.210 Ultimately then,
the Fed's independence is a reflection of a political determina-
tion that the Fed should have vast power that could be exercised
free of political influence.
The Fed in its infancy hardly appreciated its economic power.
Indeed, the modem Fed really did not exist until 1935.11 Shortly
after 1935, the Fed seems to have botched its economic responsi-
bilities and engineered the premature death of an otherwise
promising recovery from the Great Depression in 1937.212 There-
201. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 34-35.
202. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 411-21 (1994).
203. See WILLIAM C. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED 4 (1984).
204. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
205. MELTON, supra note 203, at 4; see also DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 56
("There was nothing in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 that gave the Federal Re-
serve Board the vast powers it has today.").
206. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 55-56.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
210. See id. at 46-55.
211. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 313.
212. See id. at 320.
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after, the Fed adopted a policy of almost total passivity until
after World War 11.211 Thus, through World War II and the pe-
riod immediately thereafter, the Fed generated little or no politi-
cal controversy.2 14 It was not until about 1950 that the Fed real-
ly began to exercise its monetary policy might. 15 The present
analysis is primarily concerned with the period after 1950; how-
ever, it is significant that in its detailed analysis of independent
regulatory agencies, the Hoover Commission in 1949 singled out
the Fed for its "many excellencies" in discharging its regulatory
obligations, particularly in its management of monetary policy.
216
In 1950 the Fed had its first significant policy differences with
the executive branch. After the start of the Korean War, the Fed
wanted to pursue a restrictive monetary policy to control an
expanding economy.21i The Treasury Department desired lower
interest rates so that it could manage its wartime debt less
expensively.1i President Truman stepped in to moderate the
conflict. Apparently, Truman sided with the Fed, and on March
4, 1951, the agencies executed the Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord, which recognized that ultimate authority for monetary
policy rested with the Fed.2 19 Although this accord was a mutual
promise of cooperation, it became a declaration of independence
for the Fed because it explicitly recognized that the Fed had
discretion to monetize the debt by issuing Federal Reserve Notes
in exchange for bonds or to allow increased government borrow-
ing to increase interest rates.20 The fact that Truman did not
push the administration's position and allowed the Fed to main-
tain its independence with respect to monetary policy was a
significant step in assuring the political independence of the
Fed.22' Those economists who have attempted to quantify central
213. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRArTH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT 214
(1975).
214. See id.
215. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 75.
216. HOOVER COMM1ISSION REPORT, supra note 64, app. N at 109.
217. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 75.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 327-28; DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 75.
221. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 327-28.
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bank independence focus specifically upon the central bank's
ability to set monetary policy free from the government's need to
finance operations.222 On this score, the Fed rates high marks.
After the 1951 agreement, the Fed had the power to conduct
monetary policy free from the executive's fiscal policy.
The question of whether banking interests, or other special
interests, have captured Fed monetary policy is somewhat more
complicated. 2' Banks are a "transmission belt" of the Fed's mon-
etary policy.2" The Fed can manipulate monetary conditions, but
it cannot force banks to lend or to lend at specified rates.225
Particularly with respect to long-term lending rates, the Fed is
at the mercy of the banking industry's inflationary expectations
and confidence in business conditions. 226 The Fed must, there-
fore, maintain the confidence of the banking industry.22 Con-
gress has recognized this need from the beginning of the Federal
Reserve System by providing for the creation of the Federal Ad-
visory Council (FAC).22 ' The FAC consists of powerful banking
222. See Miller, supra note 65, at 446 n.25.
223. This Article assesses the Fed's performance under its modern depoliticized
structure. This structure was not completely in place until the passage of the Bank-
ing Act of 1935. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text. Prior to that, the
banking industry had a large voice in the promulgation of monetary policy, through
their control of the district banks and the voice of those entities in making mone-
tary policy. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 56-57. Scholars have found that
under this regime, the Fed allowed the interests of the b'anking industry to domi-
nate. monetary policy-even to the extent of causing tight monetary policies in the
depths of the Great Depression which greatly exacerbated that calamity. See Gerald
Epstein & Thomas Ferguson, Monetary Policy, Loan Liquidation and Industrial Con-
flict: The Federal Reserve and the Open Market Operations of 1932, 44 J. ECON.
HIST. 957, 982-83 (1984) (concluding that the Fed tightened money in 1932-33 to en-
hance bank profits from government securities while disregarding the detrimental
effect on the rest of the economy). These findings are not very relevant to an analy-
sis of the institution that the Fed is today.
224. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNE-
APOLIS ANNUAL REPORT 1, 11 (1982).
225. See generally Tom Herman, Many Banks Gripe but Higher Prime Rate May
Help Some Become More Profitable, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1980, at 29 (explaining
how banks often set their own interest rates).
226. See Corrigan, supra note 224, at 11.
227. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 86 ("Securing confidence means considering
in a focused way the long-term interest of finance and vigorously fighting inflation.").
228. See id. at 114-16 (explaining that the FAC was added to assuage the disap-
pointed commercial bankers).
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interests that are granted privileged access to the Fed through
regular, formal meetings. 9 Scholars studying the minutes of
these meetings have concluded that the Fed dominates the ses-
sions and uses them to obtain important information from the
banking industry; thus, these scholars have concluded that the
Fed is not controlled by the FAC. 3 °
Often, the FAC has been an unmitigated failure in seeking to
influence Fed policy. In the late 1970s, the FAC complained that
the Fed's refusal to pay interest on the reserves maintained by
member banks with the Federal Reserve System constituted a
discriminatory tax upon members.23 ' Congress, at the Fed's urg-
ing, responded by requiring all banks to keep interest-free bal-
ances with the Fed. 32 The Fed seems to use the FAC to gather
important information and influence bank industry conduct.3
The FAC is perhaps best viewed then as an institutional man-
date to consider information obtained from the banking industry
in making decisions regarding monetary policy. This institution-
al mandate may be mistaken for obsequious behavior by a regu-
lator beholden to the industry it regulates.2 ' Nevertheless, near-
ly all observers agree that the banking industry does not control
the Fed's monetary policy machinery, and that the Fed regularly
undertakes monetary initiatives that are contrary to the short-
term interests of the banking industry it regulates. 5
229. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 261-62 (1994).
230. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 77 (citing G.L. BACH, MAKING MONETARY
AND FISCAL POLICY 178-79 (1971)).
231. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 154.
232. See id. at 154-55.
233. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 77.
234. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 114-15.
235. See, e.g., BACH, supra note 230, at 178 (stating that the Fed considers itself
"responsible to Congress and the public rather than to the banking industry");
MAXWELL NEWTON, THE FED 249 (1982) (T]he Federal Reserve System has presided
over a major decline in the very institutions it was supposed to support and nur-
ture-the banks of the United States."); WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 85-87 (ac-.
knowledging that the Fed often does what bankers need instead of what they want
and often acts contrary to bankers' short-term preferences). But see Wright Patman,
The Federal Reserve System: A Brief for Legal Reform, 10 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 300
(1969) (stating that the Federal Reserve has "shockingly" close ties to the banking
industry). It is interesting that Congressman Patman's critique of the Fed appears to
be motivated by the Fed's open defiance of the President. See id.
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For example, in October of 1979 the Fed determined that
interest rates needed to rise rapidly."3 6 As a politically attractive
means of achieving this, the Fed began to target monetary ag-
gregates instead of interest rates, which in turn increased inter-
est rate volatility, at least in the short-term.3 7 Understandably,
banks, as lenders, would like stable interest rates.238 Targeting
monetary aggregates instead of a given interest rate level natu-
rally leads to increased interest rate volatility. There is little
doubt that this increased interest rate volatility hurt the bank-
ing industry, as the relative value of outstanding loans declined
and commercial banks lost deposits to relatively more attractive
money market mutual funds.239 Such instances of demonstrable
harm to the banking industry in the name of economic stability
are inconsistent with any theory of monetary policy capture. 24°
In fact, on a general basis, banks prefer prosperity. With pros-
perity the demand for loans increases and bank balances ex-
pand. Rates of default decline, and banks can make money even
on many imprudent loans. When the Fed undertakes a restric-
tive monetary policy these conditions do not prevail, and in an
extreme recession even sound loans can lead to losses.241 Any
time the Fed tightens money, therefore, the banking industry
suffers. Yet, the Fed has undertaken several rounds of very
restrictive monetary policy in recent decades.242 Thus, at least
with respect to the Fed's administration of monetary policy,
there is strong evidence that the Fed's powers have not been
"captured."
As mentioned above, unlike agencies that suffer from persis-
tent problems of regulatory competition, the Fed enjoys a regula-
236. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 82.
237. See id. at 82-83.
238. See id. (suggesting that banks are hurt by interest rate variability).
239. See Herman, supra note 225, at 29.
240. Commentators have distinguished the Fed's control of monetary policy from its
regulatory power in assessing its susceptibility to capture. See WOOLLEY, supra note
108, at 85. The thesis of this Article tracks this distinction by focusing only upon
the Fed in its capacity as chief monetary policy regulator, and not upon its general
bank regulatory role.
241. See generally Stuart I. Greenbaum et al., Monetary Policy and Banking Profits,
31 J. FIN. 89 (1976) (explaining the impact of monetary policy on bank profits).
242. See infra notes 256-82 and accompanying text.
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tory monopoly over the administration of monetary policy. Con-
gress has, in fact, jealously guarded the Fed's turf.2" For exam-
ple, in the late 1970s the Fed began to lose members. As interest
rates rose, the cost of maintaining interest-free reserves at the
Fed increased. By early 1980, Chairman Volcker testified to
Congress that the Fed was in danger of losing full control of
monetary policy because Fed membership was in danger of drop-
ping to below sixty percent of the banking industry.'4 Congress
responded quickly.2 45 In 1980, it required that all depository in-
stitutions adhere to Fed-dictated reserve requirements and re-
port to the Fed.24 Congress thus demonstrated its commitment
to the Fed and the Fed's exclusive control over monetary policy,
giving the Fed no need to consider the policies of any regulatory
competitor.247
Of course, the banking industry can always lobby the Presi-
dent or Congress, even if it cannot directly influence the Fed.
This raises the issue of whether the Fed truly is independent of
the political branches. Before this issue can be properly as-
sessed, however, independence must be considered in context.
Specifically, no commentator seriously believes that the Fed
should be completely independent of elected leaders, even if our
constitutional system permitted such a structure.24 s Such unbri-
dled power is utterly inconsistent with our republican tradition.
Instead, independence must be considered on a relative basis.
Some political accountability is both desirable and mandated by
the Constitution. 249 Given its finctions, the Fed appears ideally
independent. 2 0 The Fed can defy powerful politicians, but is also
243. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 154-63 (recounting the political maneuvering
leading up to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980).
244. See id. at 157.
245. See id. at 162.
246. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
247. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 70.
248. See, e.g., LASTRA, supra note 156, at 49-59.
249. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
250. See BACH, supra note 230, at 209 (MThe present degree of 'independence' from
the White House is about right."). Some commentators in the past have disagreed
vehemently with the performance of the Fed as well as its political independence.
See, e.g., Edward J. Kane, External Pressure and the Operation of the Fed, in POLIT-
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aware that ultimately it must be accountable to the will of the
people.
251
As mentioned above, over the years both legislators and presi-
dents have made strong statements endorsing the Fed's political
independence. One commentator has stated: "few members of
Congress really want to control monetary policy."25 2 This reflects
several facts. First, Congress understands fully its own institu-
tional limitations in managing monetary policy. Congress has
neither the time nor the dexterity to really control monetary
policy. 2 3 Indeed, it could be disastrous if monetary policy be-
came locked up in Congress due to competing power coalitions.
Second, there appears to be strong consensus among influential
policymakers that monetary policy must be administered free
from special interest influence.2  Politicians, no doubt, also have
appreciated the political cover that comes with having the Fed
as a scapegoat for economic disruptions. There is broad consen-
sus that all of this amounts to a strong bipartisan commitment
to the Fed's independence.2 5
This does not mean that the Fed does not have conflicts with
the President or Congress. On the contrary, the Fed constantly
is subject to political conflict, and thereby subject to political
pressure. For example, in 1979 the Fed dramatically tightened
ICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC MONETARY RELATIONS 211, 211-32
(Raymond E. Lombra & Willard E. Witte eds., 1982) (criticizing the Fed for catering
to political pressure from Congress and the White House). Most of these attacks
emanate from the period of the early 1980s when the nation faced severe economic
challenges and the Fed was under a barrage of criticism. See, e.g., id. More contem-
porary commentators take a more benign position with respect to the Fed. See, e.g.,
CARL H. MOORE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 169 (1990) (stating that Paul
Volcker managed the crisis of the early 1980s, restored market confidence, and halted
inflation). Financial regulation experts have long recognized that political indepen-
dence does not imply a lack of accountability. See LASTRA, supra note 156, at 49-59.
Indeed, "an independent central bank needs to be accountable" or when it takes
unpopular actions it will be destroyed. Id. Free societies cannot be expected to toler-
ate unaccountable power. See id.
251. See MOORE, supra note 250, at 169 (quoting former Fed Chairman Martin:
"The Fed cannot, in the long run, act contrary to the wishes of the people as ex-
pressed through their elected officials").
252. WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 191.
253. See id. at 190-91.
254. See supra text accompanying note 102.
255. See Kane, supra note 250, at 212.
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money at the beginning of the presidential election cycle. 6 On
August 16, 1979, seven days after Chairman Paul Volcker was
sworn in, the Fed raised the discount rate to an all-time high of
10.5%.257 Then, in October of 1979, the Fed became serious about
fighting inflation and allowed key short-term rates to climb to
eighteen percent.258 In March of 1980, the Fed even went so far as
to impose credit controls.2 19 In mid-1980, the economy suffered a
severe recession, as the gross national product shrank by ten
percent, the sharpest contraction in thirty-five years.2 60 Jimmy
Carter lost the election of 1980 and key supporters attributed
the defeat, at least in part, to the Fed's tight money policies.2
President Carter attacked the Fed's policies but never at-
tacked the Fed's independence.262 Carter likened the Fed's in-
dependence to the independence of the judiciary.2 3 Thus, as the
election slipped away, the President of the United States was
reduced to telling voters, that although he disagreed with the
Fed's policy, he had no influence over it. 2  The Fed had allowed
a sitting President to perish upon the battleground of monetary
policy.265 Even more impressive is that Chairman Volcker acted
with such monetary restraint just a short time after President
Carter appointed him to his post with the Fed.266 For the most
256. See GREmDER, supra note 91, at 76.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 125.
259. See id. at 185-86.
260. See id at 185; see also DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at 112 (discussing
the history of credit controls).
261. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 218; MELTON, supra note 203, at 61 ("The Fed
confounded such skeptics by making policy progressively tighter as the economy re-
bounded. Interest rates promptly retraced their earlier declines and marked new
records, with predictable consequences for Carter's reelection campaign. Henceforth,
inflation would be combated through a continuing policy of monetary restraint-with
no gimmicks.").
262. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 152; see also WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 125
(discussing Carter's "electioneering" and concluding that "what is more telling is that
Carter resisted the temptation to attack for so long").
263. See id. at 217.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 214.
266. See id. at 217-18. Contemporary observers maintained that financial markets
forced President Carter's hand into appointing a chairman far more conservative
than he would have preferred. See The Dollar Chooses a Chairman, Bus. WK., Aug.
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part, the Fed's tightening had occurred despite objections from
the Carter White House.267 The Fed had successfully resisted
political pressure and instead tamed inflation.2 8
Another example of the Fed's ability to defy even Presidents
occurred during the Reagan Administration. Shortly after the
1980 election the administration announced $540 billion in tax
cuts. 269 Simultaneously, the administration announced hundreds
of billions in defense spending increases.2 0 Fed Chairman
Volcker concluded: "'There is no way we can avoid a clash be-
tween monetary restraint.., and the growth of economic ac-
tivity."271 In other words, Volcker was signaling his intent to
counter any fiscal stimulus with tighter monetary policy. Soon
enough, the Fed allowed short-term rates to reach as high as
20.5%.272 The Fed even went so far as to lobby members of Con-
gress against the President's tax cut program.7 3 Unemployment
soared as twelve million Americans were out of work.27 4 The
gross national product declined sharply.275
With constituents starting to feel real pain, and with the 1982
elections fast approaching, both political branches undertook
6, 1979, at 20. Still, it seems clear that by hurting a sitting president, consider-
ations other than politics motivated Volcker.
267. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 214-15. The White House had requested that
the Fed impose credit controls. See id. at 184. The Fed resisted; in the end, howev-
er, the Fed was not institutionally prepared for a public showdown with the Presi-
dent. See id. Nevertheless, the administration persistently opposed the Fed's interest
rate increases. See id. at 120.
268.
The Volcker Fed's great achievement was to arrest decisively the inflation
spiral that by 1979 had been accelerating for well over a decade. From
its peak rate (on a year-over-year basis) of almost 15 percent in early
1980, the consunier price index decelerated to a mere 3 percent rate by
the end of 1983. Most economists would have thought so massive a slow-
down impossible to achieve in such a short span of time, and almost
none had sufficient foresight to predict it. But if the scale of the
disinflation was monumental, so were the costs of achieving that success.
MELTON, supra note 203, at 191.
269. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 353.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 355 (quoting Chairman Volcker).
272. See id. at 402.
273. See id. at 398.
274. See id. at 454.
275. See id. at 507.
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initiatives striking at the heart of the Fed's independence.
James Baker, the White House Chief of Staff, began to lobby the
Fed for a more expansionary monetary policy.276 At the same
time, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan proposed that the Fed
become a subagency of the Treasury Department, directly ac-
countable to the President.277 Congressional efforts to strip the
Fed of power ranged from forcing the Fed to abandon its reli-
ance upon monetary aggregates to a congressional resolution
commanding the Fed to reevaluate its monetary policy.278 Signif-
icantly, financial interests did not react favorably to suggestions
that the Fed be stripped of independence.279 Despite real concern
about its institutional independence, the Fed held monetary
policy tight and resisted the highest degree of challenge to its
institutional independence. 2 0 The Fed had scored a major polit-
ical victory.28 ' It had again fulfilled its basic mission to forsake
political pressures and constrict growth to stem inflation.282
276. See id. at 490.
277. See id. at 490-91; WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 118.
278. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 474-75. Periodically, Congress has taken stabs
at curtailing the Fed's independence, but no serious initiative to impose real re-
straints upon the Fed has ever gained enough steam to become law. See, e.g.,
Patman, supra note 235, at 323-26 (providing an example of a legislative initiative
to restrict Fed independence).
279. See Vartanig G. Vartan, Independent Fed Is Supported, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28,
1982, at D7.
280. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 491-94.
281. From an economic point of view the Fed arguably exercised excessive restraint
in monetary policy. At least one former Federal Reserve Board economist has con-
cluded that the Fed's policy erroneously caused "extra and unintended disinflation"
and an unintentional "economic depression' in 1981-82. MICHAEL G.
HADJIMICHALAKIS, THE FED. RESERVE, MONEY AND INTEREST RATES: THE VOLCKER
YEARS AND BEYOND 10 (1984). During this period unemployment reached a high of
10.8%. The economy also contracted 5.3% in the fourth quarter of 1981 and 5.9% in
the first quarter of 1982. See GREIDER, supra note 91, app. B. at 724-25. Neverthe-
less, the sheer magnitude of the Fed's shortcomings, and the real pain spawned by
them, are a testament to its resistance to political pressures.
282.
[Nione of the postwar expansions died of natural causes-they were 61
murdered by the Fed over the issue of inflation. Once an expansion got
under way and unemployment came down, wage and price inflation
would pick up. Then the Fed, like a matron at a sock hop, would, as the
recently deceased Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin observed,
"take away the punch bowl just when the party gets going."
Rudi Dornbusch, Growth Forever, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1998, at A18.
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This is not to say that the Fed is never subject to political
influence. The Fed, under Chairman Arthur Burns, has been sub-
ject to controversial allegations that it specifically manipulated
monetary policy in order to influence the election of 1972.2s
There is also strong evidence that the Fed allows its desire to
avoid the appearance that it is manipulating monetary policy to
influence elections, to cause it to refrain from policy steps it oth-
erwise may take.2M These concerns do not subvert the thesis of
this Article. First, this Article fully recognizes that under the
Constitution no lawmaking actor can be immune from political
pressure. Second, this Article argues that some political respon-
siveness is a good thing; that is, an agency with no degree of
political responsiveness would likely cease to exist.285 Third, it is
fully consonant with the Fed's mission to guard jealously its
independence, even if this requires the Fed to play politics.
28 6
Finally, a politically ambitious Fed chairman probably could
influence monetary policy based upon inappropriate political
pressure. The question, however, is simply whether the Fed is
sufficiently independent that it can resist political pressure. All
283. There is little question that in 1972 the Nixon Administration wanted the Fed
to ease monetary policy. Nixon's advisors admit they played hardball with Chairman
Burns, in an attempt to obtain favorable monetary conditions for the election of
1972. See GREHDER, supra note 91, at 342; WILLIAM SAFIRE, BEFORE THE FALL 619-
20 (1975). The administration even suggested a plan to pack the Fed, much akin to
FDR's court-packing plan. See GREIDER, supra note 91, at 342. What is far more
controversial is the question of whether Chairman Burns intended to influence mone-
tary policy to enhance President Nixon's chances of success in the election of 1972.
Compare WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 155 (arguing that monetary policy in 1972
reflected the Fed's defense of its political autonomy in response to the
Administration's attack upon its independence), with Sanford Rose, The Agony of the
Federal Reserve, FORTUNE, July 1974, at 91, 186-90 (suggesting election manipula-
tion).
284. See SHERMAN J. MAISEL, MANAGING THE DOLLAR 117 (1973) ("Federal Reserve
policy has always been to avoid, if possible, taking any major monetary actions as
elections approach."); WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 129 (arguing that even though it
seems to avoid "partisan manipulation," the Fed "tries to lie low" during presidential
elections); Of Bulls and Bears and Financial Clockwatchers, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19,
1994, at 85 (arguing that the Fed avoided raising rates until after the 1994 elec-
tion).
285. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
286. See Dornbusch, supra note 282, at A18 ("The Fed is a keenly political institu-
tion simply because that is the only way it can maintain the independence necessary
to make good policy.").
550
DEPOLITICIZING FINANCIAL REGULATION
of the above is consistent with the suggestion that the Fed has a
high degree of resistance to inappropriate political influence,
even if it is not absolutely immune from such influence.8 7
There can be little dispute that the Fed has demonstrated
well a key advantage of agency delegation: the rapidity of its
policy changes in response to fluctuating economic conditions. In
one recent period of just over a year, the Fed changed key inter-
est rates seven times.288 Congress could never hope to be so
nimble. Effective monetary regulation does not permit subjuga-
tion to the regular legislative process,28 9 because monetary policy
is so important to so many groups that it is very likely that
Congress would become a battlefield of competing interests. In
other areas, Congress has been persistently deadlocked and
important reforms have been delayed. There is every reason to
believe that banks, thrifts, the real estate and construction in-
dustry, the retail industry, the auto industry, and even the gov-
erfiment itself, which all have stakes in containing inflation or
interest rates, would lobby Congress and frequently freeze it
from acting at all. Instead, the Fed has proven that it is capable
of moving quickly and decisively. Similarly, the Fed has also
been able to move very quickly to stem potential financial melt-
downs-most famously in October, 1987, when the Fed flooded
the markets with liquidity immediately after the 1987 crash.290
Virtually all commentators acknowledge the Fed's success in this
area.
291
287. In sum, the Fed has the ability to impose harsh policies against the wishes of
the political branches; at times, the Fed nevertheless chooses to adhere to political
considerations in setting monetary policy. See DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 88, at
76-77.
288. See Foust, supra note 137, at 50; see also WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 164
(showing in figure 8.2 that from the end of 1972 to mid-1973 the Fed dramatically
engineered a series of rate increases that moved the federal funds rate from about
5% to nearly 11%).
289. The Hoover Commission explained the advantages of agency regulation in this
respect in 1949. See generally HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, app. N
at 431 (discussing the bipartisan composition of independent regulatory commissions).
290. See Foust, supra note 137, at 47.
291.
The leeway the Fed enjoys on the inflation front is particularly important
in case of a stock market disaster. A minor correction surely won't lead
the Fed to cut rates-the three hawks on the board won't stand for it,
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Another benefit to expect from diminished political influence
over regulation is the improved expertise in regulation. In a de-
tailed study of the Fed's hiring practices with respect to top
positions, Professor Woolley demonstrated that: (1) Fed officials
are drawn from responsible financial positions in the private
sector or academia; (2) the Fed hires personnel from elite back-
grounds, such as prestigious educational institutions, more fre-
quently than other government agencies, and at rates compa-
rable to the private sector; and (3) Fed officials appear to vote
independently of the positions previously held.292 All of this
demonstrates that the Fed has assembled a staff of professionals
who vote independently of parochial interests. This is consistent
with the observations of others who have studied the Fed, for
example, that the Fed is operated by officials "drawn from the
broad American middle class" and are "splendid proof of an
American meritocracy."29 According to regulatory theorists ana-
lyzing the causes of agency capture, one of the sources of capture
is the temptation of agency staffers to allow the prospect of lu-
crative private employment to influence agency _decisions. 4
Professor Woolley determined that former Fed officials, however,
do not achieve high posts in private finance, but instead migrate
to nonfinancial positions. 295 Finally, although Professor Woolley
concluded that the banking industry naturally had some control
over key personnel decisions, he also found that "it is very
doubtful that the influence of the bankers through the recruit-
ment process is sufficient to guarantee them detailed control of
policy."296
nor will the chairman. But if a massacre gets underway, just as in 1987,
Mr. Greenspan is sure to act very quickly. This ensures that markets
won't melt down, which in turn rules out one potent source of recession,
namely a precipitous unbounded loss of confidence. .
Dornbusch, supra note 282, at A18. In May of 1973, the Fed raised the short-term
Fed Funds rate nearly three quarters of one percent; at the time this was the larg-
est one-month increase in history. See Rose, supra note 283, at 188.
292. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 67-68 (examining data from 1955 to 1982).
293. GREIDER, supra note 91, at 71.
294. See supra text accompanying note 78.
295. See WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 67; see also 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) (impos-
ing two-year postemployment restriction upon Fed members who fail to serve their
entire 14-year term).
296. WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 75.
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So what does all of this mean? First, one must observe that
there is no credible empirical, anecdotal, or logical basis for
concluding that monetary policy, at least in modern times, has
ever been hijacked by special interests regarding a major mone-
tary policy decision. 97 Second, although the Fed is not free of
political influence transmitted through the executive or legisla-
tive branches, it is sufficiently independent that the political
branches are quite challenged in influencing monetary policy
and seem to have no ability to influence it on behalf of any one
special interest. Instead, politicians have a difficult enough time
attempting to influence monetary policy in order to enhance
their electoral chances. The historical and empirical record sug-
gests that the Fed has not exercised its power over monetary
policy for the benefit of special interests.29
The Fed thus demonstrates the central points of this discus-
sion: important economic regulation can be secured against the
pernicious influences of special interests. Benefits of expertise,
regulatory flexibility, and stability of policy can be secured,
while special interest influence can be quelled. Monetary policy
should not be subject to electoral politics because voters cannot
be expected to master its intricacies. Though this recognition
makes administrative regulation more appropriate, the economic
stakes are so enormous that special interests cannot be permit-
ted to influence such regulation. Consequently, Congress has
endowed the Fed with the power to move quickly and expertly in
administering monetary policy-essentially free from the influ-
297. See id. at 85-87 (summarizing available evidence and concluding that "bankers
do not shape Federal Reserve decisions in an ongoing, detailed way"). To the extent
any regulatory theorist holds that regulation is inexorably dominated by the regulat-
ed, Professor Woolley has shown that from 1979 to 1982, when a financial crisis
gripped our nation, the Fed overruled bankers on several issues. See id. at 87.
298. See supra notes 217-35 and accompanying text. Of course, there is always the
argument that "It]he Federal Reserve is part of a larger system of power that is
dedicated to maintaining an economic system producing vastly disproportionate dis-
tributions of wealth." WOOLLEY, supra note 108, at 188. This view fails to ac-
knowledge, however, that the American system of regulated capitalism has delivered
vast wealth on a fairly wide-spread basis. In any event, this Article approaches the
question of special interest capture from the point of view of the Fed's role in our
system, which is to provide a stable currency and thereby foster growth. See 12
U.S.C. § 225a (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
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ence of special interests. This, in turn, informs the question of
when depoliticized regulation is appropriate. This Article argues
that depoliticization is an appropriate means of improving regu-
lation, and not an attack on our republican tradition, when: (1)
the voting public has insufficient time, interest and resources to
make informed electoral decisions; (2) powerful interests exist
that may benefit disproportionally from regulatory policy; (3) the
costs of misregulation are diffused and deferred; (4) the regula-
tory environment evolves quicker than Congress can legislate;
(5) competing power blocks may persistently "freeze" Congress;
and (6) the regulated area is so complex that a high degree of
expertise is necessary for effective regulation.299
The Fed is faced with a regulatory environment that fits these
conditions like a glove. Monetary policy is an ideal area for
depoliticization.3 00 The remainder of this Article evaluates and
applies this model of depoliticized regulation to other areas of
financial market regulation. A necessary predicate to this exer-
cise is a clear understanding of the shortcomings of the current
regulatory framework. Thus, Part III focuses on the problems
inherent to the present regulatory approach, in order to deter-
mine if it too presents a set of circumstances appropriate for
depoliticized regulation.
299. Professor Grundfest has recognized a set of conditions under which govern-
ment can be subverted by special interests, which dovetails the factors discussed
above. He derives these factors from the specific context of the savings and loan
debacle:
In most situations, there is a delicate ecological balance that prevents
Congress from being too generous in the favors it grants any one constit-
uency. The balance, however, is vulnerable to the tactics of a rogue con-
stituency that 1) has a broad geographic base; 2) pursues a noncontrover-
sial ideology that is popular with the middle class; 3) actively finances
congressional campaigns; and 4) is willing to exploit Congress's fiscal
blind spots. A constituency that combines these four characteristics can
strong-arm Congress into providing unconscionable benefits, while
claiming that it imposes no costs on the federal treasury.
Joseph A. Grundfest, Lobbying into Limbo: The Political Ecology of the Savings and
Loan Crisis, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 25, 26 (1990). Professor Grundfest essentially
posits that regulation can be hijacked by exploiting complexity, low issue salience
and manipulating the political process.
300. Internationally, monetary policy is vested in independent central banks to an
increasing extent. See LASTRA, supra note 156, at 1.
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III. AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION
Political scientists long have recognized that administrative
agencies, congressional oversight committees, and the business in-
terests of the regulated may form an "iron triangle": a political
subsystem that can subvert public policy in favor of policy choices
dictated by select interest groups.0 1 The regulation of banks,
other financial institutions, and financial markets generally,
naturally is more inclined to succumb to these influences be-
cause these are "money" industries."°2 Regulation is complicated
further due to the presence of deposit insurance, which creates a
unique moral hazard because poor banking may lead to costs
that the government absorbs instead of making reckless deci-
sions. o0 Federally guaranteed deposit insurance can be a partic-
ularly attractive subsidy from a particular lawmaker's point of
view; in the vast majority of circumstances the subsidy will
never impose any cost upon the government during the
lawmaker's life. Typically, deposit insurance is a deferred cost to
the government that is imposed only about once a generation.
0 4
Deposit insurance is illustrative of another dynamic of financial
market regulation: the economic stakes can be huge.0 5 As is
certainly the case in other areas of regulation, this enormous
economic power, and the size of the economic stakes, expose a
major flaw in our two-party system: a major check in our politi-
301. See, e.g., WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 1-19 (citing several other authorities
holding this same view).
302. One observer has noted that the Senate Banking Committee is a "money"
committee. See GREIDER, supra note 11, at 66 ("'If you're on Banking or the Finance
Committee, you don't even have to open your mouth. They'll throw money at you
over the transom.' (quoting Sen. Bumpers)).
303. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SAVINGS
& LOAN CRISIS 11 (1992) (defining "moral hazard" in the context of the savings and
loan crisis).
304. See generally Grundfest, supra note 299, at 25 (assessing the politics of the
savings and loan crisis and stating that "under current budgeting procedures some
constituencies can manipulate Congress to provide massive private benefits at sub-
stantial public cost").
305. See id. at 32 (referring to deposit insurance and stating that "few industries
have been able to persuade Congress to bankroll them to the tune of up to $500 bil-
lion").
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cal system can be eliminated if both parties can be co-opted. °6
When combined with low issue saliency, this environment is ripe
for special interest abuses. Simply stated: "When it comes to fi-
nancial regulation, the norm is for business to be conducted by
those intimately connected to the enterprise with as little out-
side involvement as possible."30 7
Professor Jeffrey Worsham has undertaken a detailed study of
agency regulation in the context of the banking industry.308 His
conclusions provide a detailed explanation of the dynamics of
banking regulation. Though Professor Worsham's study is limited
to the banking industry, his findings provide a strong basis for
generally explaining the dynamics of financial market regula-
tion. Indeed, history demonstrates that the regulatory maladies
he identifies permeate financial market regulation. °9
Worsham's study offers a number of conclusions that support
the thesis of this Article. First, ordinarily the banking industry
dominates banking regulation. 10 In a detailed study of the me-
chanics and output of the legislative process, Professor Worsham
concluded that organized interests generally "reign supreme;"31'
that is, the banking industry is at the head of a bank-dominant
306. One dramatic example of this breakdown in our system is the savings and
loan fiasco of the 1980s. Even though a multibillion dollar taxpayer bailout was in
the works during 1988, it was not even a minor election-year issue. According to a
lobbyist at the American Bankers Association: "Everyone knew [what] the game was:
Democrats don't bring this up, Republicans don't bring this up. Because a firefight
on this issue will have more bodies on both sides than anyone wants to lose."
GREIDER, supra note 11, at 73.
307. WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 21.
308. See id. at 17 ("[T]his study examines the evolution of subsystem arrangements
in a single policy area-financial regulation-over a period of roughly 100 years.").
309. See generally id. at 24-47 (discussing the role of special interests in financial
regulation determination from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s).
310. See id. at 46 ("[Blank-dominant coalitions are the norm in the financial sub-
system."). It is noteworthy that Professor Worsham's analysis assumes that the Fed's
independence is the result of a transitory coalition that displaced the bank dominant
coalition in the wake of the high issue saliency generated by the Great Depression.
See id. at 44-45.
311. Id. at 83. Professor Worsham's study utilizes a mapping approach to tracking
the influence of special interests to specific policy outcomes. He does this by analyz-
ing participation profiles of those participating in congressional hearings, analyzing
the source of bills introduced, and analyzing the content of regulatory outputs. See
id. at 49-85.
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coalition that includes the banking industry itself, the federal
banking regulators, and congressional committees.3 12 This politi-
cal subsystem produces legislation that benefits banks dispro-
portionately. 13 This is particularly so when legislation can deliver
concentrated benefits in exchange for diffuse or deferred costs. 14
For example, the costs of relaxing regulation targeted at the
safety and soundness of bank activities are deferred and dif-
fused, while the benefits of relaxation accrue in the form of in-
creased profits to the banking industry.31 These iron triangle
tendencies are inconsistent with sound regulation. 16
Second, though the bank-dominant coalition is the norm, tran-
sitory factors often subvert this coalition's power. 17 Issue sa-
lience is the bane of special interests.1 8 When issues attract
little public attention, special interests can impose their will
with relative ease.3' 9 Conversely, when issues attract a high
degree of public interest, special interests can be defeated. 20
Ordinarily, issues relating to financial market regulation do not
attract the attention of the public. Thus, the bank-dominant
coalition can work its will because of the public's general disin-
terest in financial market regulation, except in times of financial
321crises.
Worsham applies his theory, convincingly, to the passage of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,22 by demonstrating
312. See id. at 3 (defining dominant coalitions as consisting of regulators, regulated
and congressional elements).
313. See id. at 129.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 103 (noting that bank-dominant equilibrium has little concern for
safety and soundness regulation).
316. See Roe, supra note 13, at 16 (stating that regulation of corporate financial
structure is not determined solely by economic efficiency but also by "powerful politi-
cal constraints").
317. See WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 130-35.
318. See id. at 4 (noting that special interest "coalitions thrive under conditions of
little competition and low issue salience").
319. See Croley, supra note 20, at 5 (explaining that public interest theory suggests
that low levels of public scrutiny allows special interests to subvert regulation).
320. See Brown, supra note 3, at 202-22 (demonstrating how the media can mobi-
lize disorganized majorities). Professor Brown concludes that "public choice theory
works best when it analyzes legislative issues that are not important to the majority
of voters." Id. at 215.
321. See WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 25.
322. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50
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that it initially had its genesis in the New Deal initiatives of the
1930s.3 23 Because such legislation was introduced in the late
1930s instead of the early 1930s, Worsham concludes that the
"subsystem players"--the "regulators and regulated"-were able
to prevent any restrictive legislation.324 By 1938, issue saliency
for such reform was simply too low to thwart the special interest
subsystem players.3 25 By 1956 they were able to modify the New
Deal initiative enough to divert the regulatory energy to a fun-
damentally favorable outcome.326 In its final form, the Bank
Holding Company Act insulated the banking industry from com-
petition against insurance companies, like Transamerica, and
generally expanded the powers of banks.327 Subsystem play-
ers-specifically the banking industry and its regulators-were
able to achieve a result that protected the competitive turf of the
banking industry and expanded investment opportunities. 328 To
secure the Act's passing, the Fed acceded to the American Bank-
ers Association's insistence that the Act include a loophole for
bank holding companies owning a single bank.3 29 This was key
because it resulted in expanded bank activities;330 hence, the
original New Deal initiative of curtailing bank holding compa-
nies to achieve a safer and sounder banking system was subvert-
ed completely.
331
Economic dislocation can create political pressure for reform
and lead other political actors, like the President, to wrest power
from the bank-dominant coalition.3 2 The Great Depression led to
the New Deal, which emphasized safety and soundness in
(1994)).
323. See WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 89-92.
324. Id. at 92.
325. See id. at 103.
326. See id. at 104.
327. See id. at 103-05; see also John D. Hawke, Jr., Reflections on the Ongoing
Effort to Modernize Financial Services Regulation, 49 MERCER L. REv. 777, 777
(1998) (stating that the Bank Holding Company Act has "served principally to divide
markets among politically influential segments of the financial services industry").
328. See WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 104.
329. See id. at 103.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id. at 131.
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regulation." The banking industry's ability to influence regu-
lation receded and a variety of significant reforms, including the
abolition of the state and federal dual regulatory regime, made
it onto the congressional agenda.334 Transitory factors other than
economic dislocation may increase the salience of a particular
issue of bank regulation. 35 For example, the bank bailout crisis
of the 1980s produced major legislation that dramatically re-
structured the regulatory environment, and even abolished key
parts of the iron triangle.336 Although these transitory factors
occasionally serve to reduce industry domination, they do not
assure that regulation is sound fundamentally or that our system
of financial regulation is the best economically.3 For example,
although political concerns .awakened Congress to the savings
and loan industry pillaging the Treasury, there was no real
systematic review of deposit insurance and government guaran-
tees in order to assure that this form of subsidy was well-controlled
and dispensed only in appropriate circumstances. 8
Professor Worsham's findings can be extended from banking
regulation to financial market regulation generally. Specific
examples of subsystem and iron triangle regulation can be
drawn from the corporate governance area, the securities regula-
tion area, and more recent forays of Congress into the financial
institution reform area. All of these examples demonstrate that
in a political environment financial market regulation is subject
to "capture" by the very interests that are supposed to be regu-
lated. Concentrated benefits are extended to these interests in
exchange for deferred and diffused costs. Economic dislocation or
issue salience may counteract these tendencies, but-given the
333. See id. at 41-43.
334. See id. at 40.
335. See id. at 11, 135.
336. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401(a) 103 Stat. 183, 354 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) (abolishing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation); see also Grundfest, supra note 299, at 31-32 (arguing
that political consequences of the savings and loan debacle caused Congress to exact
retribution against the savings and loans industry and its lobbying organization).
337. See Roe, supra note 13, at 65-67.
338. See Grundfest, supra note 299, at 32-33 (analyzing risks from $750 billion in
loan guarantees).
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complexity of the subject matter and the rapid evolution of the
regulatory environment-increased public awareness does not
necessarily restore sound regulation.
Transitory factors are also important in attracting the atten-
tion of the President.339 President Roosevelt was the agenda
setter and ultimate source of political muscle that reformed the
nation's financial structure in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion.34 ° In terms of the structure of our financial regulation re-
gime, presidential leadership has been essential historically. For
example, President Wilson was a primary supporter of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act and President Roosevelt was the primary mover
behind the New Deal Bank regulatory initiatives as well as the
federal initiative to regulate the securities markets. 4' Presi-
dents, though, are busy and easily distracted by foreign affairs
or other matters.342 The natural consequence is that in the ab-
sence of transitory presidential interest, policy is subject to dom-
ination by special interests.
The enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PLSRA)343 demonstrates these points. This Act quite
simply stacked the deck against private securities plaintiffs in
order to protect powerful business interests from the costs of
litigation.3 " Congress passed this Act even though there was no
convincing empirical support of any need for such regulation
3 45
and even though there was no evidence that the business inter-
ests pushing for the "Reform Act" were suffering unjustifiably."
Commentators had argued that the private securities litigation
system suffered from problems of extortionate settlements,
339. See WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 46.
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id. at 103-04.
343. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
344. See Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation:
Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1055, 1093 (1999) (concluding that the PSLRA "merely rigs private securities claims
so that defendants almost always win").
345. Private Securities Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Sec. of Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong. 114 (1993) (statement by SEC Enforcement Director William R. McLucas
that the SEC staff found evidence of a securities litigation crisis "inconclusive").
346. See Ramirez, supra note 344, at 1085-87.
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which in turn caused economic damage. 47 Nevertheless, the
remedies for such problems far exceeded these justifications.
Indeed, Congress could have remedied these problems with far
more narrow solutions-such as imposing a mandatory arbitra-
tion regime-but chose instead simply to rig such litigation in
favor of defendants. 349 These putative defendants essentially
captured Congress through a concerted, well-funded lobbying
effort."' They received rather concentrated benefits in the form
of relief from litigation costs. The cost of these benefits were
deferred by a slow erosion of investor confidence and diffused
throughout the investing public.35' Although such costs may
come due only once a century, when they are paid, the viability
of capitalism itself can be called into question.3 2 Although the
issue reached some level of saliency, public resistance was muted
by portraying the Act as aimed at "entrepreneurial lawyers."8
Consequently, the PSLRA is an exemplary case of congressional
capture.3  In the final analysis the public could not comprehend
the complexity of the issue and had little incentive to resist the
vested business interests.3 55 The SEC, the primary securities
347. See id. at 1055-56 n.1.
348. See id. at 1093; see also Office of the Gen. Counsel, Sec. and Exch. Conm'n,
Recent Legislative Developments Affecting the Work of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in 2 THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1996, at 647, 651 (1996) (stating that the
PSLRA includes provisions that "extend[ ] beyond frivolous litigation").
349. See Ramirez, supra note 344, at 1095-96.
350. See id. at 1087 n.156.
351. Congress has emphasized investor "protection" as an important, even compel-
ling, policy objective because "it is a basic teaching of this nation's financial history
that continued economic health fundamentally depends upon the maintenance of
investor confidence." H.R. REP. No. 94-123, at 43-44 (1975); see also H.R. REP. No.
73-1383, at 5 (1934) (emphasizing the importance of investor confidence to the sta-
bility of our economic system).
352. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) (stating that securities markets are "frequently"
subject to manipulation, excessive speculation, and unreasonable fluctuations causing
national economic emergencies).
353. Ramirez, supra note 344, at 1069 n.50.
354. See GREIDER, supra note 11, at 39 ("[I]t is not an exaggeration to say that
democracy itself has been 'captured.").
355. See, e.g., Ann Reilly Dowd, Look Who's Cashing in on Congress, MONEY, Dec.
1997, at 132 (listing the PSLRA as the best example of the relationship between
laws, money, and lobbying, noting that the PSLRA was backed by a $29.6 million
war chest); see also 141 CONG. REC. S17,976 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Boxer) (citing USA Today for the proposition that the PSLRA was a "blatant
payoff' for campaign contributions from powerful business interests).
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regulator, did not retain sufficient agency power to define inves-
tor remedies. 56 Consequently, the special interests prevailed.
Another problem area for the SEC has been staffing. In the
early 1980s, when deregulation was in vogue, SEC staffing suf-
fered. Unfortunately, the securities markets were just beginning
an era of expansive growth.35" The SEC found itself seriously
underfunded.3 5 ' The Reagan Administration's emphasis on de-
regulation, backed by incomplete scholarly exposes on the prob-
lems plaguing regulatory agencies, thus left financial markets
woefully underpoliced at a critical time.3 59 Frauds of unprece-
dented magnitude resulted. 60 Michael Millken devised a new
type of securities market, for junk bonds, built upon a "founda-
tion of fraud and manipulation."361 The SEC eventually uncov-
ered a multibillion dollar investment scheme that Prudential-
356. For its part, the SEC has, over the years, taken apparently inconsistent posi-
tions on the whole issue of private securities litigation reform. See, e.g., Paul
Beckett, Levitt's Stance on Reform Act Surfaces Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at
B12; see also supra notes 158-69 (detailing further the SEC's role in legislative re-
form). It is clear that the SEC did not support the PSLRA. See Office of Gen. Coun-
sel, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 348, at 651 (stating that the bill extended
beyond its policy basis, and would have a negative effect on meritorious claims). Un-
fortunately, the final letter that SEC Chair Arthur Levitt sent to Congress regarding
the PSLRA failed to voice any sign of objection from the SEC, instead stating that
the bill addressed "[our] principal concerns." 141 CONG. REC. S17,935 (daily ed. Dec.
5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). In fact, the press reported that the SEC sup-
ported the PSLRA only after it had been threatened with budget cuts and other
forms of congressional penalties. See Scot J. Paltrow, SEC Chief Shift on Investor
Bill Is Linked to Senate Pressure, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at D1 (quoting Andrew
R. Vermilye, legislative director to Senator Richard H. Bryan, that Senators "threat-
ened to turn off the lights" at the SEC). Ultimately, without denying that political
pressure was applied, Levitt made clear that he opposed the PSLRA. See 141 CONG.
REC. S17,994 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bryan). The SEC's inability
to object forcefully to the PSLRA betrays its lack of real independence.
357. See H.R. REP. No. 98-101, at 1-5 (1983) (noting that the SEC enforcement
budget declined by 11% from 1979-83, during a time period when public offerings
increased by 96% and trading volume in securities increased 82%); see also The
Market Reform Act of 1989: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and the
Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 11 (1989) (statement
of Sen. Sasser) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (noting approval of 18% increase in SEC
funding after it was "underfunded throughout the 1980s at a time when volume and
complexity in the markets has increased enormously").
358. See Joint Hearings, supra note 357.
359. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 20, at 166-68.
360. See Ramirez, supra note 344, at 1089-91.
361. Id. at 1090.
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Bache Securities fraudulently sold to thousands of retirees and
other conservative investors, involving a web of scandal-ridden
limited partnerships.362 Vast networks of nefarious insider trad-
ing festered in the darkness of deregulation.3 Though the costs
of this debacle are difficult to calculate, the carnage in terms of
real lives ruined is astounding."'
Another area that demonstrates the distorting effects of poli-
tics upon financial regulation is our nation's fragmented finan-
cial regulatory structure. Professor Roe, for example, has demon-
strated persuasively that corporate finance has been influenced
by political factors that have prevented corporate finance from
evolving in accordance with economic pressures. 65 Professor Roe
focused on populist and progressive distortions of financial mar-
ket structure, convincingly demonstrating that these elements,
suspicious of concentrated financial domination by "Wall Street,"
influenced the structure of corporate finance. 66 Other important
elements have similarly distorted financial regulation. For ex-
ample, financial institutions themselves work to decentralize
regulatory power and protect their turf from other potential
competitors. 67 It is an open secret that the insurance industry
would rather be regulated by "50 monkeys than one big goril-
la."368 Thus, industry too seeks to fragment regulatory power,
even if indirectly so, and to take advantage of the regulatory
permissiveness that results. Industry also seeks fragmentation
because of the ease of wielding political influence at the state
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id.; see also 141 CONG. REC. S17,945 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Bryan); John R. Emshwiller, How Career Swindlers Run Rings Around SEC
and Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1995, at Al (reporting the suicide of a Mis-
souri farmer who was wiped out by a securities swindler).
365. See Roe, supra note 13, at 11 (attributing the fragmentation of financial insti-
tutions to politics).
366. See id. at 32-45.
367. See id. at 45-53 (stating that "interest group pressures were critical" to the
political efforts to fragment financial power, small banks wanted to hobble large
money center banks, and managers would resist the ability of financial institutions
to monitor their control of industry).
368. Scot J. Paltrow, The Converted: How Insurance Firms Beat Back an Effort for
Stricter Controls, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1998, at Al (noting concerns about states'
ability to regulate insurance).
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level. As previously discussed, the Bank Holding Company Act is
a piece of this same dynamic.369
For example, the United States traditionally has had a dual
federal-state system of bank regulation. ° This system has
spawned regulatory permissiveness and competition that has
imposed real costs upon the United States taxpayer.3 1 During
the 1980s, when the savings and loan crisis was brewing, a
number of states began to deregulate their savings and loans.
37 2
California, home of the infamous Lincoln Savings, and Texas
were in the vanguard of this movement.7 3 California allowed
thrifts chartered in that state to operate "virtually free of any
constraints." 74 Of course, in light of federal deposit insurance,
there were few incentives for states to be concerned about pru-
dential regulation of state-chartered thrifts. As long as the feder-
ally backed deposit insurance fund bore responsibility for mak-
ing good the losses of a failed state-chartered thrift, "there was
no great incentive for many state legislators to deny the sweep-
ing demands for additional investment powers made by the
thrift industry."375 California also slashed its regulatory person-
nel and granted their state-chartered thrifts expansive invest-
369. See supra notes 322-31 and accompanying text.
370. See generally Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking Industry, 52 VA. L.
REV. 565, 568, 597 (1966) (tracing development of the dual banking system and
discussing regulatory competition between state and federal systems as well as
among federal regulators). There is little logic to the regulatory structure of the
banking industry. It has long been recognized that the hodge-podge structure of
state and federal regulators has produced inefficiencies and conflict. See DE SAINT
PHALLE, supra note 88, at 39; see also Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System:
A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30-36 (1977) (demonstrat-
ing through an empirical study that regulatory competition exists).
371. As early as 1949, the Hoover Commission sounded the alarm on the deleteri-
ous effects of the "crazy quilt of overlapping jurisdictions" among state and federal
bank regulators. See HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, app. N. at 116.
The Hoover Commission stated that this dispersion of regulatory power could well
lead to a future banking crisis and recommended that regulatory power be consoli-
dated. See supra note 370.
372. See Edwin J. Gray, Warnings Ignored: The Politics of the Crisis, 2 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 138, 139 (1990).
373. See id.; see also Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judg-
ment Rule in Banking: Implications for Corporate Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,
45 (1996) (discussing deregulation in Texas).
374. Gray, supra note 372, at 139.
375. H.R. REP. NO. 101-54, pt. 1, at 297 (1989).
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ment powers.376 California allowed its thrifts to operate every-
thing from windmill farms to horse-breeding operations."77 Ac-
cording to Edwin Gray, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB), during the early 1980s, such promiscuous
lawmaking was the natural cause of the dual-chartering system:
"the only motivation for [dual-chartering] seems to have been to
provide... political contributions from those who are regulated
for persons who make and administer state thrift laws. 78 Ulti-
mately, taxpayers from coast to coast paid for this folly. In 1988
alone, state-chartered thrifts in Texas and California accounted
for seventy percent of the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corporation's expenditures.3 79 This sordid episode of regulatory
competition occurred even though scholars had long catalogued,
and warned of, the problems arising from such competition.8 °
Even beyond regulatory competition, politics was the driving
force in the spectacular regulatory failure leading to the savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s.3 8' Indeed, there is now a growing
consensus that that much of the $1 trillion in costs arising from
this debacle is attributable to political distortions of regulatory
policy.38 2 These political distortions have their origins in severe
376. See Gray, supra note 372, at 139.
377. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-54, pt. 1, at 297; Gray, supra note 372, at 140.
378. Gray, supra note 372, at 141; see also Scott, supra note 370, at 1-2 (quoting
Fed officials on the dangers of dual banking regulation).
379. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. 1, at 297.
380. See Hackley, supra note 370, at 568 (noting that many commentators have
voiced concern over competition). Not all commentators accept that regulatory compe-
tition is necessarily pernicious. Professors Butler and Macey have shown, however,
that in the context of federal deposit insurance, regulatory competition results in
"race in laxity." See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Com-
petition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CoRNELL L. REV. 677, 680 (1988). This
Article takes the position that at least a number of instances of regulatory dysfunc-
tion in the financial arena can be explained best from the perspective of regulatory
competition, or a regulatory race to the bottom. See id. More recently, one commen-
tator has observed: "With regard to traditional bank activities, the current system
fosters competition between regulators." Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk
Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 460 n.128 (1998); see also Langevoort, supra
note 8, at 685-87 (discussing regulatory competition in the banking industry and
analyzing the race to the bottom by states in eliminating usury protections).
381. See Grundfest, supra note 299, at 29 ("[Olverall it would be hard to find a
better example of the 'capture' hypothesis than the relationship that existed between
the [savings and loan industry] and the FHLBB.").
382. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, Comment on Political Foundations of the Thrift
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failures by Congress as well as the primary thrift regulator, the
FHLBB, to resist the political influence of the savings and loan
industry.383 One of the fundamental reasons why the savings
and loan crisis grew into such a large problem was because of
political decisions made to deprive regulators of the funding
necessary to resolve the crisis, and deregulation initiatives that
supposedly would open more opportunities to thrifts but really
just exposed them to greater risks.8 Insolvent depository in-
stitutions cannot be closed without adequate funds because
depositors must be given the benefit of deposit insurance pay-
ments to the extent deposit liabilities exceed assets.
Depriving regulators of the funds needed for the shutdown of
insolvent thrifts allows only losses to mount because it is ex-
ceedingly difficult for a depository institution to make money
when it has more liabilities than assets. Banks survive on the
margin by which income on assets exceeds the cost of liabili-
ties, 85 so it helps to have more assets than liabilities. Similarly,
allowing an industry that traditionally had made mortgage loans
upon the collateral of single-family residential homes to sudden-
ly assume riskier lending that the industry, is ill-prepared to
underwrite and manage is a certain way to increase losses. To-
gether, deferring the shutdown of ailing thrifts and at the same
time expanding the risks they could undertake proved a volatile
mix.
The thrift crisis had its genesis in the high interest rates of
the late 1970s.3 11 Most thrift assets were long-term, low-interest
Debacle, in POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE EIGHTIES 209-14 (Alberto Alesina &
Geoffrey Carliner eds., 1991) ("Romer and Weingast are correct when they argue
that the fundamental causes of the thrift mess are political rather than economic or
criminal."); Romer & Weingast, supra note 58, at 178 (arguing that special interests
influenced Congress to delay remedial legislation and tolerate assumption of exces-
sive risks by thrifts); see also GREIDER, supra note 11, at 60 ("Leaving aside the
financial and economic complexities, the savings and loan bailout is most disturbing
as a story of politics-a grotesque case study of how representative democracy has
been deformed.").
383. See Grundfest, supra note 299, at 26.
384. See Romer & Weingast, supra note 58, at 186 (noting that the Reagan admin-
istration was adverse to additional funding); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. 1, at
301, 305 (1989).
385. "Banks buy what they lend and live off the 'interest differential' between the
price they pay and the price they charge." MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS 553 (1974).
386. See NATIONAL COMMN ON FIN. INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCE-
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rate home mortgages.387 Most thrift liabilities were short-term
deposits.3 18 When short-term interest rates soared, thrifts hem-
orrhaged money; most of their assets were locked in at low rates
while the cost of their liabilities soared.3 89 By 1981, the
industry's net worth had evaporated. 90 In accordance with then
prevailing political winds, the initial response to this problem
was to deregulate the industry.391 In 1982 the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act became law and the scope of thrift
activities expanded.392 This initially caused a huge growth in
industry assets. Indeed, while industry assets grew by fifty per-
cent between 1982 and 1984, the staffing of thrift regulatory
agencies stagnated in accordance with deregulation vogue.393 The
FHLBB, the primary industry regulator, requested a signifi-
cantly increased budget for 1985, which the Reagan Administra-
tion rejected. 94 Indeed, according to Edwin Gray, he "begged"
annually for more supervisory personnel to regulate the bur-
geoning thrift industry, but the Reagan Administration re-
sponded by questioning his loyalty to its deregulation agenda. 5
The FHLBB certainly did not have clean hands in this fiasco.
Instead, the FHLBB was a willing participant in a convoluted
scheme to sweep the thrift crisis under the carpet.396 In the early
MENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 5, 29-32 (1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL
COIUMVN].
387. See LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR
BANK & THRIFT REGULATION 61-65 (1991).
388. See id.
389. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. 1, at 291.
390. See Romer & Weingast, supra note 58, at 176.
391. Although deregulation may be appropriate in some arenas, as will be shown,
it has not tested well in the financial market regulatory context. See infra notes
450-66 and accompanying text. In any event, according to former White House Press
Secretary Michael McCurry, industry calls for deregulation are difficult to resist: "If
you come back from your fifth fund-raising trip of the year, where you schlepped up
and down Wall Street with your tin cup, then you listen [to] . . . their arguments
about the efficiency of financial deregulation and so forth, you begin to say, yeah,
they've got a point." GREIDER, supra note 11, at 259.
392. See Romer & Weingast, supra note 58, at 177.
393. See id. at 187.
394. See id.
395. See Gray, supra note 372, at 141.
396. See Grundfest, supra note 299, at 29-30.
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1980s it was clear that the savings and loan industry was in the
midst of a deepening crisis."' Still, if the most insolvent thrifts
had been closed at this point, tens of billions of dollars could
have been saved. Industry lobbying groups persuaded the
FHLBB to adopt new accounting standards called "Regulatory
Accounting Principles." 98 This accounting approach allowed
losses to be transformed into assets by allowing thrifts to spread
certain losses over a period of up to forty years. 99 This masked
the worsening financial condition of the industry and allowed
institutions that should have been shut down to remain in busi-
ness.
400
Predictably, this led to disaster. When financial institutions
are near insolvency, deposit insurance creates perverse incen-
tives. Naturally, banks are drawn to high-risk ventures because
the insurance fund absorbed losses, whereas profits will allow
management to continue.40 ' Some commentators term this moral
hazard "gambling for resurrection."0 2 This is not a new concept.
The Council of Economic Advisors specifically warned the Presi-
dent of these problems in both 1984 and 1985.403 When these
risks fail to save the bank, but instead plunge it deeper into
insolvency, things go from bad to worse. The fact that a bank
survives on the extent to which its income on its assets exceed
the costs of its liabilities means that when liabilities are greater
than assets it is difficult to turn a profit. The thrift industry
consequently lost $7.8 billion in 1987 and $12 billion in 1988.404
These two factors, gambling for resurrection and the acceler-
ation of negative net worth, meant that it was crucial that fail-
397. See NATIONAL COMM'N, supra note 386, at 43.
398. See id. at 43-55.
399. See id.
400. H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. 1, at 297-98 (1989) (summarizing major provisions of
regulatory accounting principles and stating that it "played a central role in the
thrift crisis").
401. See Grundfest, supra note 299, at 32 ("ITihe banking industry's insurance fund
is not as solvent as it seems, and [analysts] have sounded warnings that 'more than
1,000 banks with about one-half of the nation's banking assets [are] undercapital-
ized.'").
402. Romer & Weingast, supra note 58, at 175, 177-78.
403. See id. at 186.
404. See id. at 201.
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ing banks be closed quickly and the bleeding stanched. In the
thrift crisis, politics prevented any quick resolutions of failing
thrifts and instead imposed a policy of forbearance.0 5 As early
as 1985 the Chairman of the FIHLBB was pleading for more
funds to shut down more failing thrifts. 4 6 In 1986, bills that
would have recapitalized the deposit insurance fund, which in
turn would have funded more thrift shutdowns, died, giving
thrifts de facto forbearance from regulatory closure.0 7 In 1987, a
bill that would have allowed an additional $15 billion to be used
to close thrifts failed to pass Congress. 4 8 Econometric studies of
the vote on this bill show that legislators' votes were "clearly
related" to the thrift constituents within each legislator's dis-
trict.4 9 Finally, in 1987, Congress raised the borrowing limit for
the deposit insurance fund to $10.8 billion, but at the time the
fund was $6 billion in the red and faced $50 billion in future
claims.41 This was a classic case of too little, too late.
Eventually, Congress fully funded the costs of the savings and
loan crisis in 1989, at a total cost to the taxpayer of about $200
billion.411 The policies of deregulation and forbearance had their
source in both Congress and the Reagan Administration. 4' The
policy of forbearance responded to two important impulses.
First, the savings and loan industry did not want to recognize
405. See id. at 176 ("We argue that Congress was the major source of regulatory
forbearance during the crucial period of 1985-1987.").
406. See id. at 177.
407. See id. at 192-94.
408. See id. at 195-96.
409. Id. at 195-200; see also Steve Blakely, Panel Approves $5 Billion FSLIC Res-
cue Plan, 1987 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 635 (reporting lobbying efforts by the savings
and loan industry in opposition to FSLIC funding).
410. See Romer & Weingast, supra note 58, at 200.
411. See id. at 201. Actually, this does not include the nearly $500 billion in fore-
gone output that the Congressional Budget Office attributes to the savings and loan
mess. Nor does it include the hundreds of billions of dollars that will be paid in
interest as a result of the government's decision to finance the cost of the bailout
over periods of up to 40 years. See Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 U.S.C.
Section 1821(k): Congressional Subsidizing of Negligent Bank Directors and Officers?,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 625, 629 (1996).
412. Representative Jim Leach, a member of the House Banking Committee, re-
marked that the savings and loan crisis was "a wonderful story about the nature of
modem politics. Why is it so hard for the Congress to do something for the public?"
GREIDER, supra note 11, at 65.
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widespread shutdowns.413 Second, the politicians did not want to
explain the crisis in an election year. Indeed, the politicians
appear to have worked deliberately to put off any day of
reckoning until after the 1988 election.414 The FHLBB fought
this policy. The President's economists warned of the problems
inherent in forbearance. The politicians trumped the experts and
the American taxpayers suffered greatly. The savings and loan
crisis essentially was a politically generated crisis. Certainly,
there are important economic factors underlying this crisis, but
fundamentally promiscuous congressional attitudes allowed the
crisis to transmogrify from an industry crisis to a crisis of gov-
ernment that resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in losses
to the United States Treasury.415 The thrift crisis is best viewed
as a natural consequence of what happens when a major finan-
cial services industry controls its regulators416 and co-opts Con-
gress.417
The same issues giving rise to the savings and loan crisis also
have coalesced to create a compensation crisis in corporate
America and to allow managers of the nation's largest corpora-
tions to shirk fiduciary duties. It has been an amazing dynamic:
managers have simultaneously redoubled their compensation
while striving to constrict their legal duties to almost nothing.
The great majority of states now allow managers to contract
413. M. Danny Wall, the Chairman of the FHLBB in 1987, stated: "The industry
was saying very uniformly but quietly that we want to wait for the next President."
Id. at 71.
414. See id. at 60-78.
415. One notorious example of politicians exacerbating the crisis is the celebrated
Keating Five scandal of 1990. A bipartisan group of five legislators intervened on
behalf of Charles Keating, who controlled the poorly operated Lincoln Savings &
Loan, in order to seek regulatory forbearance. Ultimately Lincoln failed at a cost to
the taxpayers of $1 billion. See id. at 27 (noting that no charges were brought
against the Senators).
416. "The U. S. League . . . was so mighty that it regularly got its pick of regula-
tors," or, as former Chairman Ed Gray stated: "I was to be their patsy." Brooks
Jackson & Paulette Thomas, Waning Power: As S&L Crisis Grows, U.S. Savings
League Loses Lobbying Clout, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1989, at Al.
417. See Findings of Booz-Allen and Hamilton Study of FHLBB: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Banking,
Fin. and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 30 (1987) (statement of Henry B. Gonzalez)
("Everything the industry has wanted the Congress has rolled over and given it to
them . . . and the results are plain.").
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away the duty of care.418 Duty of loyalty violations typically
require a corporate insider to obtain an improper benefit at the
expense of the corporation, and therefore usually involve inten-
tional wrongdoing.419 Short of this, shareholders usually cannot
recover against corporate managers for losses incurred.42 All of
this occurred at the state level, and is a direct result of the fact
that states have long been in a race to the bottom of corporate
standards.42
The SEC, even though Congress created it to assure that
investors could rely upon "fair and honest markets," has no
power to define the rights of investors as shareholders nor the
duties of those who manage publicly held companies. 22 Instead,
the critical issues of shareholder rights and management duties
are left primarily to state law. Theoretically, if securities mar-
kets were competitive markets operating efficiently, those corpo-
rations choosing inferior state law governance schemes would be
punished and their stock price would suffer.4' Eventually, these
firms would face higher costs of capital and would suffer from
competitive damage. 4' Thus, -over time, markets would assure
that corporations with public ownership chose the most efficient
418. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209-21 (1988)
(analyzing state legislation over a three-year period that allowed restricted officer
and director duties in 40 states).
419. See id. at 1209-16.
420. See 1 AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01
(1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (imposing liability only for irrational business
judgments). Even the ALI is apparently subject to political pressure. See Alex Elson
& Michael L. Shakman, The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: A Tainted Pro-
cess and a Flawed Product, 49 Bus. LAW. 1761, 1763-68 (1994).
421. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (noting that Delaware is in the lead in the race
to the bottom); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation
and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 220 (1996) ("If
CEOs are overcompensated it is because of a deficiency in corporate governance, not
because of a deficiency in our income tax laws."). Professor Lowenstein criticizes the
efforts of the SEC and IRS to deal with excessive compensation, and instead propos-
es limited federal action to require shareholder approval of CEO compensation. See
id. at 221-23.
422. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
423. See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholders Protection and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977).
424. See id. at 257-58.
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state of incorporation to take advantage of the best rules of
corporate governance.425
The reality is that investors neither care about nor have the
ability to judge the state of incorporation and the impact that
this has either upon their rights or profits. There is therefore
little empirical evidence showing that markets integrate a state
of incorporation or change in corporate governance into stock
426prices. One study shows that firms that reincorporated in
Delaware showed no statistically significant impact upon their
stock prices.42 v Perhaps the most persuasive evidence on this
issue, however, is what has occurred in the laboratory of reality.
"The most distinctive aspect of the last decade in corporate law
was the celerity with which traditional constraints on corporate
managers weakened."42' This rapid change, after decades of
stability, on many different fronts, has the look more of politics
at work than markets at work.4 29 What is theoretically efficient
in 1999, was theoretically efficient in 1979.
Nowhere have the results of this regulatory competition been
more pronounced than in the area of executive compensation,
which in recent years has increased rapidly.3 The erosion of
425. See id. passim (arguing that market forces do not always result in a race to
the bottom).
426. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUsINESs ASSOCIATIONS 563
(1996) (summarizing empirical studies and concluding that the studies cast doubt on
whether stock prices reflect governance terms); see also Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence
J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to
'Change" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551, 601 (1987) (showing that "inves-
tors do not view the Delaware courts' decisions as events").
427. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Un-
healthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulations, 53 J. BUS. 259, 281-82 (1980) (find-
ing that such firms also failed to sustain supranormal returns).
428. Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49
MD. L. REv. 947, 949 (1990). Professor Seligman notes three legal developments as
the source of increasing laxity in manager duties. First, are the recent restrictions in
shareholder suffrage. See id. at 949-56. Second, is the decline of tender offers as a
source of discipline. See id. at 956-66. Third, is the decline of shareholder litigation.
See id. at 966-71. Each of these is consistent with the point here that managers are
simply not subject to the same constraints as in the past.
429. See Eson & Shakman, supra note 420, at 1763-68; see also Hanks, supra note
418, at 1209 ("[The first state to respond to the developments of the mid-1980's was
Indiana, in April 1986, followed by Delaware in June. Since then, forty other states
have adopted some form of legislation designed to reduce the risk of directors' per-
sonal liability for money damages.").
430. See Linda J. Barrs, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
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fiduciary duties has given managers and boards greater latitude
in setting their compensation.4' Even respected business jour-
nals have raised serious questions about the risks posed by
runaway compensation, particularly stock options. 2 These risks
can include unwarranted market disruptions and even recession
of the general economy.' The idea of federal incorporation of
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 100 (1992) (calling for courts to cease
using the business judgment rule to shield excess compensation in all cases). Be-
tween 1983 and 1993 real annual pay for CEOs increased 70%. See MARGARET M.
BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9 (1995); see also Stacey Tevlin, CEO Incentive Contracts
Monitoring Costs, and Corporate Performance, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1996,
at 39 ("The after-tax real wage of the average worker in the United States has
fallen 13 percent in the last 20 years, while the average . .. CEO ... has received
a pay raise of over 300 percent."). There is good news on the issue of executive
compensation. Specifically, it appears that compensation is positively correlated to
the performance of a company. See John F. Boschen & Kimberly J. Smith, You Can
Pay Me Now and You Can Pay Me Later: The Dynamic Response of Executive Com-
pensation to Firm Performance, 68 J. BUS. 577 (1995) (finding pay correlated to per-
formance). Nevertheless, this correlation fails to resolve the question of whether lax
fiduciary duties have allowed unnecessarily high compensation, even if correlated to
a company's success. If corporate managers can use their newfound advantages to
garner higher wages across the board, then positive correlation is meaningless, be-
cause such a dynamic will compromise international competitiveness and contribute
to domestic inequality.
431. See Loewenstein, supra note 421, at 202 ("I suggest that no clear answer
emerges from empirical work as to whether CEOs are over compensated but that
apparent deficiencies in corporate governance support the popular perception that
they are."); see also 1 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 420, §§ 5.03, 7.19 (1994) (stating
restrictions applicable to compensation challenges).
432. See James Champy, Taking Stock: Management Strategies, FORBES, Oct. 19,
1998, at 107 (stating that payment through options can encourage unneeded layoffs);
Editorial, Cream: Further Evidence on Incentives and Fat Cats, ECONOMIST, May 4,
1996, at 12 (criticizing the use of stock options to give excessive compensation to
CEOs and citing studies showing that CEOs with small stakes in their firm perform
well, but that giving CEOs a large stake can "dampen their entrepreneurial zeal");
see also Gretchen Morgenson, Stock Options Are Not a Free Lunch, FORBES, May 18,
1998, at 212 (stating that stock options are diluting earnings and are accounted for
in ways that overstate earnings).
433. Cf. SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTrSCHALTE, AMERICA UNEQUAL 1-14 (1995)
(showing that income inequality is greater than any time other than immediately
before the Great Depression); SEYMOUR HARRIS, SAVING AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1948)
(arguing that disparity in income distribution lowered the average propensity to
consume and contributed to the Great Depression). The causes of the Great Depres-
sion are complex and controversial. See generally MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 1-20 (1987) (reviewing various theories of the causes of the economic
disruptions of the 1930s). Nevertheless, in light of this uncertainty, it would seem
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the nation's largest industrial concerns has a long and storied
past. The earliest proponents of federal incorporation included
John D. Rockefeller and representatives of J.P. Morgan's
interests.4" Although this Article does not necessarily argue for
a federal incorporation regime, it does argue that fragmenting
regulatory power over corporate governance, for publicly traded
corporations, can lead to unhealthy regulatory competition and
erodes the ability of the SEC to discharge its basic mission of
investor protection. Thus, this is yet another area where regula-
tory consolidation in an expert agency, like the SEC, can be
expected to pay dividends.
The most recent political failures, however, are in many ways
the most telling. In the summer of 1999, many observers were
hopeful that American financial institutions would finally be
subject to a regulatory framework that recognized the modern
competitive realities of the financial services industry.4 5 A bill
that will greatly ease obsolete regulatory restrictions, S. 900,
most sensible to avoid all of the economic imbalances that accompanied the Great
Depression, including severe income inequality. Along these lines, it is interesting to
note that those who were charged with resolving the Great Depression, attacked the
problem on many fronts, including fighting the maldistribution of income, which they
seemed to intuitively understand as one factor leading to the Great Depression. For
example, when Senator Wagner introduced the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,
he stated:
When wages sink to low levels, the decline in purchasing power is felt
upon the marts of trade. And since collective bargaining is the most
powerful single force in maintaining and advancing wage rates, its repu-
diation is likely to intensify the maldistribution of buying power, thus
reducing standards of living, unbalancing the economic structure, and
inducing depression with its devastating effect upon the flow of com-
merce.
79 CONG. REC. S7572 (1935) (address by Sen. Wagner introducing the National La-
bor Relations Act, May 15, 1935). From the point of view of international competi-
tiveness, American CEOs earn almost twice as much as CEOs in other free-market
economies. See The Need for Greed, ECONOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 80. This fact also
seems to rebut any argument that CEO compensation levels are the result of market
pricing. Cf JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY
263 (1998) (analyzing the causes and risks of growing income inequality in America
and concluding that "we need a rebellion now").
434. See KOLKO, supra note 169, at 63-64.-
435. See Michael Schroeder, Financial Services Bill, Buoyed by Vote in House, May
Reach Clinton Before Fall, WALL. ST. J., July 6, 1999, at A3 (noting the enthusiasm
of lawmakers, administrative officials, and others for the possible passage of finan-
cial regulation).
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wound its way through Congress and competing blocks of special
interests 6 For many decades politics had foiled financial insti-
tution regulatory reform.437 Although the political gridlock pre-
venting financial institution modernization was finally broken,
despite a long history suggesting otherwise,438 'regulatory mod-
ernization to accommodate these changes appears to have been
an afterthought. 9
The quest for financial institution regulatory modernization
aptly illustrates the pernicious effects of regulatory competition.
All commentators and regulators agreed that regulatory modern-
ization was needed.' Still, it was not clear until the very last
minute that the President was going to sign the Act."' Although
the Treasury Department has sought regulatory reform for de-
cades, it was prepared to recommend to the President that he
veto the measure if it concentrated too much regulatory authori-
ty in the Fed at the expense of the Department of the Trea-
436. See S. 900, 106th Cong. (1999).
437. See, e.g., Mike McNamee, The Staring Contest That's Stalling Bank Reform,
Bus. WY-, Mar. 1, 1999, at 31 (posing the question whether "after a quarter century,
[have] the planets... finally aligned for an overhaul of the U.S. financial sys-
tem?").
438. See icl For example, Senator Phil Gramm has used the push for financial
institution reform to lead a charge to water down the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA). In late 1998, Gramm killed an earlier version of H.R. 10 because it did not
ease CRA restrictions. Again in 1999, Gramm raised the issue, undermining the
prospects of any reform, CRA or otherwise. See Michael Schroeder, Financial-Services
Overhaul Bill Facing Strong Opposition Clears a Senate Panel, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
1999, at A4. For many years, special interest groups have stifled various proposals
for reform. See, e.g., Steve Blakely, Panel Votes Bare-Bones Bill to Aid FSLIC, Trou-
bled Banks, 44 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1893, 1894 (1986) (reporting that business
interests, including nonbank-banks such as Sears and American Express have suc-
cessfully blocked financial services reform). In 1991, the securities industry, the in-
surance industry and small banks allied to deny expanded powers to large banks.
See, e.g., John R. Crawford & Alissa J. Rubin, Panel Members Put Obstacles in Way
of Overhaul Bill, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2608 (1991).
439. See Ralph Nader, Banking Jackpot, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at A33 (noting
that the new law fails to adequately address safety and soundness concerns or to
address regulatory weaknesses).
440. See McNamee, supra note 437, at 31 (noting that Republicans, Democrats,
banks, insurers and security firms all agreed that the restrictions needed revision).
441. See Schroeder, supra note 435, at A6 (stating that President Clinton
threatened to veto the Senate version of H.R. 10); see also Leslie Wayne, House Acts
to Ease 30's Banking Curbs by One Vote Margin, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1998, at 21
(recounting the death of H.R. 10 in 1998).
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sury.' 2 The Fed regulates bank holding companies."4 The Fed
argued that banks should conduct expanded financial services
activities only through affiliates of bank holding companies,
thereby vesting regulatory power in the Fed.u'4 The Treasury
wished to allow banks to conduct such activities through bank
subsidiaries." 5 There is limited difference in terms of safety and
soundness because each structure creates a corporate veil, or
"fire wall" between the bank and the new activity.' The Fed
claimed that its proposed structure precluded banks from using
a safety-net subsidy as a competitive advantage.' 7 The Treasury
responded that any such subsidy could spread as easily up-
stream to holding companies and affiliates as downstream to
subsidiaries."8 Given that the safety-net subsidy may not exist
and that it does not appear to act only in the context of subsid-
iaries, the regulators should not threaten to kill financial mod-
ernization in the name of regulatory turf."9 This consideration
simply should not be given any weight.4"0 The reality is that
fragmented regulation, a result directly attributable to the polit-
ical nature of regulation, long operated to frustrate appropriate
modernization.
Even before the passage of S. 900, the regulatory competition
between the Fed and the Treasury seemed to be giving rise to
442. See David G. Oedel, Introduction to a Panel on the Modernization of Financial
Regulation: What Is the Governmental Role in Finance, Anyway?, 49 MERCER L. REv.
771, 772 (1998).
443. See John D. Hawke, Jr., Reflections on the Ongoing Effort to Modernize Fi-
nancial Services Regulation, 49 MERCER L. REV. 777, 778-79 (1998) (explaining the
Fed's emphasis on holding company subsidiaries rather than bank subsidiaries).
444. See id.
445. See id.
446. See id. at 779. If losses occur in the bank affiliate conducting the expanded
activities, the bank's capital is compromised whether the affiliate is a direct subsid-
iary or a subsidiary of a parent. Either the parent will not be able to contribute as
much capital to the bank, or the banks ability to obtain capital from a subsidiary
will be diminished.
447. See id. at 778-79.
448. See id. at 779.
449. See id.
450. For a thorough analysis of the intense regulatory competition presently con-
suming the Fed and the Department of Treasury, see Carter H. Golembe, Much
More Is Involved in Agency Turf Wars than Meets the Eye, BANKING POLY REP.,
Sept. 18, 1995, at 2.
576 [Vol. 41:503
20001 DEPOLITICIZING FINANCIAL REGULATION 577
excessive risks in the financial system, as both agencies recently
have moved to expand the powers of banks and bank holding
companies.451 Both the Fed and the Treasury recently have
moved to expand the powers of bank affiliates, and the timing
and similarity of these initiatives suggests that they were the
result of conscious parallelism.45 2 In any event, banks or bank
affiliates now may be involved in a wide array of derivatives
transactions, futures and options transactions, and securities
transactions.453 The breadth of these transactions has had two
profound effects. First, these transactions have increased to such
a volume and have become so globalized that the world's finan-
cial system has become highly integrated and interconnected.
Second, the complexity of these transactions has outstripped the
ability of even the most respected regulators and industry pro-
fessionals to control such risks.4"
Experience shows that expanded financial institution powers
can bring expanded, even catastrophic risks.455 As demonstrated
above, expanded savings and loan powers were a key part of the
savings and loan catastrophe.455 A number of recent experiences
451. Compare 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (1996) (Fed initiative to ease revenue restrictions
applicable to securities activities of bank affiliates), and 62 Fed. Reg. 45,295 (1997)
(Fed elimination of restrictions applicable to bank affiliates engaged in securities
activities), with 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342 (1996) (OCC initiative to relax restrictions on
the activities of national banks).
452. See Schooner, supra note 380, at 446 (stating that OCC adopted controversial
rules so as "[n]ot to be outdone by the Fed").
453. Derivative transactions involve instruments that derive their value from the
performance of some other asset or financial instrument. See generally OFFICE OF
THE COM=ROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR No. 277, RIsK MANAGE-
MENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993) (identifying derivative products to include
structured debt obligations and deposits, swaps, futures, options, caps, floors, collars,
forwards, and various combinations thereof); Steven McGinity, Derivatives-Related
Bank Activities as Authorized by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Federal Reserve Board, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195 (1996) (reviewing regulatory
standards for derivative transactions).
454. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
455. For example, allowing banks to expand into the securities business may allow
them to exploit opportunities beyond their traditional banking business, or it may
just lead to losses, as it has for other companies that have so expanded. See Leah
Nathans Spiro, Alex. Brown: Handle with Care, BUS. Wc., Apr. 21, 1997, at 116
(recounting problems that General Electric, American Express and Kemper Insurance
experienced when expanding into brokerage business).
456. See supra notes 372-84 and accompanying text.
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serve to highlight the pitfalls of allowing banks, or their affili-
ates, to expand into the brave new world of globalized derivative
and complex financial transactions. A Swiss bank appears to
have lost $687 million in loans it made to an international hedge
fund.a57 Bankers Trust was required to cover hundreds of mil-
lions in losses suffered by customers of its securities subsidiary
in complex derivatives actions."' Sumitomo Bank, Daiwa Bank,
and Barings Bank each suffered astounding losses stemming
from international financial trades, often undertaken by single
rogue traders. 59 In the case of Barings Bank, the rogue trader
literally broke the bank.4 60 Given the increased velocity with
which the financial system transmits financial shocks, and the
inability of the best financial minds to fully comprehend this
kind of trading, regulators do not appear to have controlled ade-
quately the risks accompanying this type of complex trading.4 61
Other than general mandates concerning requirements of
safety and soundness, the banking regulators have given short
shrift to articulating specific standards for conducting such ac-
tivities. This lack of specificity betrays concerns that are more
457. See Lipin et al., supra note 7, at A6.
458. See Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust Settles Suit with P. & G., N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 1996, at D1 (stating that Bankers Trust agreed to absorb nearly $200 million in
losses); see also Kelley Holland et al., The Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WK., Oct. 16,
1995, at 108 (recounting the tactics of a Bankers Trust affiliate, summed up best, by
an agent's statement that "what Bankers Trust can do for Sony and IBM is get in
the middle and rip them off" and noting that clients sustained over $500 million in
losses). Ironically, shortly after this settlement the Fed allowed Bankers Trust to
enter the securities business in an even more visible manner, by acquiring a large
regional brokerage. See Federal Reserve Press Release, Order Approving Notice to
Engage in Nonbanking Activities, In re Banker's Trust Corp., New York, N.Y. (Apr.
8, 1997); Niamh Ring, Wedding Announcement for Bankers Trust and Alex. Brown
Pleases the Street, BoND BUYER, Apr. 8, 1997, at 5.
459. See Former Barings Trader Flies to Singapore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1995, at
D15 (noting that one trader caused $1.4 billion in losses to Barings Bank).
460. See Former Daiwa Trader Sentenced in Cover-up of $1.1 Billion Loss, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at D12 (reporting sentence of trader who caused losses in
government bond trading); Sumitomo Bank Helps Affiliate, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
1996, at D7 (noting that an affiliate of Sumitomo lost $1.8 billion in copper trading).
461. See Schooner, supra note 380, at 469 ("[Ihe current system, however, was es-
tablished at a time when banks' securities activities were virtually nonexistent. The
increase in activity over the last fifteen years calls into consideration the effective-
ness of the current model.").
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focused upon regulatory turf than regulatory prudence.462 Cer-
tainly, the regulators are aware of the risks and the history of
allowing depository institutions to exercise expanded powers in
the absence of specific regulatory guidance on managing such
risks."3 Arguably, until they gain more regulatory expertise in
this particular area of financial markets, however, the exposure
of banks and other financial instruments to this kind of activity
should be curtailed sharply.4  At the very least, the activity
must be an activity that is permitted only after thorough analy-
sis by the most expert financial regulators. Whether such analy-
sis has transpired is not presently clear.4' Given the history of
regulatory competition, and accompanying regulatory failures,
the public can have only minimal confidence in the adequacy of
the current regulatory paradigm. All of this is the backdrop to
current initiatives to deregulate the financial services industry.
Few discussions have occurred regarding the need to achieve
reform accompanied by appropriate regulation because these ini-
tiatives are driven by special interests and turf-conscious regula-
tors.4
66
Inappropriate political and special interest influence pervade
financial market regulation. The American economy has suffered
greatly as a result. The next Part addresses whether depoliticiz-
ing regulation in this area, akin to the model of depoliticized
regulation of monetary policy, would be appropriate and effec-
tive.
IV. SHOULD FINANCIAL REGULATION BE DEPOLITICIZED?
James Madison articulated the dangers of special interests,
which he termed "factions," in defending the Constitution over
462. See McGinity, supra note 453, at 1195.
463. See supra notes 55, 299, 317.
464. See Greenspan, supra note 6.
465. See supra notes 452-54 and accompanying text.
466. See Stephen Labaton, House Takes Up Financial Overhaul Measure, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1999, at C1 (summarizing efforts to deregulate financial services but
failing to mention expanded regulation to control higher risks arising from increased
powers). See generally Michael Taylor,.The Search for a New Regulatory Paradigm,
49 MERCER L. REv. 793 (1998) (discussing emergence of a new consolidated regulato-
ry paradigm to address financial integration and regulatory competition).
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two hundred years ago. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison ar-
gued that a primary benefit of the then proposed constitutional
republic was its ability to control factions.46 ' Madison argued
that factionalism was inherent to democracies and fundamental
to their failures prior to the establishment of our constitutional
republic.46 Madison stated that "[almong the numerous advan-
tages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserve[d] to
be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction."469 Indeed, Madison argued that
"any plan which... provides a proper cure" for the problems
posed by special interests should be given "due value."470
Madison could not have foreseen the complexity of our society
200 years hence, nor the concomitant expansion of government
regulatory power. Madison's fundamental point, however, re-
garding the threat posed by special interests to any democracy
was prescient. The only change that is required to modernize
Madison's analysis is the methods by which factions operate to
subvert the commonweal. Today, modern factions can operate
successfully beyond the light of public scrutiny because of the
sheer number and complexity of issues facing the government.
Politics abhors a power vacuum, and special interests move in to
fill the void left by a lack of public interest. This regulatory
reality can hardly be termed democratic, or consistent with the
republican values animating the founders of our constitutional
republic.47'1 It is axiomatic that the Constitution is fundamental-
ly designed to curb the excesses of democracy and disperse polit-
ical power.472 In a more complex society, a more complex govern-
467. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
468. See id.
469. Id. at 122 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
470. Id.
471. See id.
472. In the context of monetary policy, centralizing power in an independent agency
is an effective means of assuring that macroeconomic policy is not unduly concen-
trated in the executive branch. See BACH, supra note 230, at 210.
One hardly incites controversy today to say that the Constitution does
not envision a pure democracy in which elections serve only to translate
popular will into law. Nor could the Constitution envision such a system
and still purport to be a written constitution with the object of imposing
external constraints on popular sovereignty.
Brown, supra note 194, at 555.
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ment naturally follows. Along with such complexity comes an
inability of the political system to assure that it comprehends all
issues and addresses all issues raised by affected interests, par-
ticularly the public interest.473 This Article posits-that the Con-
stitution retains sufficient flexibility to address modern challeng-
es to our system of government, so long as the election of politi-
cians charged with regulatory supervision preserves basic politi-
cal accountability. In that manner, depoliticization can be consis-
tent with our republican tradition.
This raises the issue whether depoliticization makes good
sense in a given circumstance or area of regulation. For exam-
ple, setting up an agency to determine tax policy probably is not
consistent with our republican tradition and probably does not
make sense from either a policy or a political perspective.474 Be-
yond this, the Constitution provides little guidance on when and
to what degree depoliticization is appropriate.475 In addition,
historically there has been an incomplete appreciation for the
full spectrum of constitutionally permissible independence.476
Many factors contribute to the degree to which an agency is
endowed with real political independence. The correct degree of
independence is a complex issue that ultimately turns upon the
question of how independent an agency must be to fulfill its
mission. So far, independence seems to appear in a chaotic fash-
ion. 477
Expanded depoliticization in the area of financial market
regulation not only makes good political sense, but also makes
good policy sense. No modern commentator has seriously sug-
gested that the current regulatory framework is satisfactory.
473. For example, in 1789 when the Constitution became effective, monetary policy
did not exist. The Constitution gave Congress the power to "coin money." U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8. Still, it never would have occurred to the Framers that monetary
policy would influence the economy and that therefore politicians could manipulate it
for political ends. See BACH, supra note 230, at 211.
474. The Supreme Court has intimated that Congress could not delegate the power
to tax. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42
(1974).
475. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988
DuKE L.J. 257, 257-58 (stating that agencies seem to have "random" independence).
476. See id. at 259 (defining the characteristics of independent agencies).
477. See id. at 258-59.
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Financial market regulatory reform is desperately needed and
has been for decades.' Indeed, there have been numerous pro-
posals for reform, but political gridlock has precluded any.'79
Several concerns have driven the need for reform. First, banks
are facing technological obsolescence. Most people no longer
maintain large deposits at banks, preferring instead to enjoy
higher returns along the spectrum of risk-reward instruments
that are now available through the securities markets. 8 ° Com-
mercial borrowers meanwhile have increased their reliance upon
these markets, and borrow less from banks.'81 Even with respect
to checking accounts, other financial institutions now offer vehi-
cles that are essentially indistinguishable from demand deposit
accounts. 82 Second, with increased internationalization, scholars
and policymakers have recognized that American financial insti-
tutions are fragmented unnecessarily. With increased economic
integration and greater international capital flows, 4 the reality
is that American financial institutions must compete interna-
tionally and facilitate the ability of the American economy to
compete internationally.4"4 Regulation should recognize and
accommodate this. The current regulatory framework hobbles
this goal.485 Moreover, while allowing financial institutions the
powers to compete, regulators must recognize and control the
risks implicit in such reforms. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
recognizes these regulatory risks.4
6
Financial institutions are indispensable to our economic
health. They process payments globally so that transactions
478. See supra notes 371, 439; see also Taylor, supra note 466, at 793 ("The regula-
tion of financial services in developed economies has not kept pace with the enor-
mous changes that the industry has experienced over the last two decades.").
479. Professor Bach articulated a compelling case for significant reform nearly thir-
ty years ago. See generally BACH, supra note 230. Although many of his proposals
have been implemented, many of his recommendations have not been enacted.
480. See Schooner, supra note 380, at 441.
481. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 676-80.
482. See id.
483. See LITAN & RAUCH, supra note 17, at 45.
484. See id. at 10 (arguing that policy should promote American financial industry's
role as leading the world in competitiveness).
485. See id. at 5.
486. See supra note 6.
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need not be settled in cash-a fundamental service to our mod-
em economy.48 They serve as financial intermediaries so that
capital can be aggregated and deployed to its best use which
fuels growth.488 Finally, these financial institutions allow indi-
viduals to spread risk (through, insurance companies, for exam-
ple) or diversify their portfolios (through, for example, mutual
funds). This "risk spreading" in turn delivers real benefits to the
economy by making business more predictable and decreasing
production costs.489 Consequently, basic elements of regulation
are "not negotiable."490 Taxpayers, who bear ultimate respon-
sibility for deposit insurance, must be protected. Consumers,
whose lack of confidence can cause panic, must have faith in the
integrity of the financial system. Finally, the soundness of finan-
cial institutions must be assured.491
There is little doubt that fundamental reform is needed, but
these basic regulatory values must be an integral part of any re-
form.492 Most reform proposals include the idea that banks
should be permitted to exercise expanded powers.493 The ques-
tion thus becomes how to restructure financial market regula-
tion in a fashion that balances safety and soundness with com-
petitiveness. The proposal that the framework of this new regu-
latory structure include expanded depoliticization is fully consis-
tent with the underlying factors creating pressure for reform.
Regulators could be given the power to use expertise to deter-
mine how restructuring should occur and to break the political
gridlock that has set in on this issue. This proposal also increas-
es the soundness of financial market reform by eliminating polit-
ical and expertising regulation. This is the best means of con-
trolling the new risks being absorbed by financial institutions.
Depoliticizing financial regulation would give regulators the
487. See LITAN & RAUCH, supra note 17, at 11.
488. See id.
489. See id. at 12.
490. Id. at 7.
491. See id.
492. See id at 3 ("Current policy is based on a view of the world developed pri-
marily to prevent another Great Depression; and in doing so it relies on a mix of
practices that can and should be improved.").
493. See supra notes 8, 16, 17 and accompanying text.
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power and flexibility both to accommodate modernization and to
control accompanying risks in the public interest.
49 4
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that politics influ-
ences financial market regulation in inappropriate ways. The
problems of political financial market regulation are
transcendent, regardless whether the focus is on financial insti-
tution regulation or capital market regulation. These zones of
regulation involve transactions and regulated entities that can
often be measured in billions of dollars. By necessity, regulation
in these areas similarly involves enormous economic stakes. As
technology and globalization provide a basis for increased prof-
its, so too do these phenomena create increased risks.495 Costs of
regulatory policies in these areas often are deferred and diffused
generally throughout the investing or voting public. All of this
adds up to enormous complexity. Under these circumstances,
regulation is especially prone to costly, even catastrophic,
highjacking in favor of powerful special interests. Depolitici-
zation can stem many of the problems that appear to be inher-
ent in the current system of financial market regulation. Does
the evidence justify restructuring the political responsiveness of
financial market regulation? Agencies, as presently structured,
face grave difficulties acting in the public interest.
496
Although the empirical evidence available has not supported
fully any particular theory of regulation, it does support the
notion that under certain circumstances regulatory dysfunction
can set in.497 This Article has marshalled all available evidence
to determine if this has occurred in financial market regulation.
Lawyers, economists, and political scientists all have concluded
that the primary conditions giving rise to regulatory dysfunction
494.
[Tihe new world of finance . . . is becoming more treacherous for the
men and women in Washington . . . who . . . regulate . . . the country's
financial system. If they regulate the financial services industry too tight-
ly, they may smother it at a time when innovation is, more than ever,
its lifeblood. If they are clumsy in their efforts to stabilize it, they may
instead disrupt or undermine it.
LrrAN & RAUCH, supra note 17, at 2.
495. See supra notes 7, 401, 460 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 1-5, 20 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 4, 13, 58, 108 and accompanying text.
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are prevalent in the regulation of financial markets."' Building
upon this evidence, the present analysis demonstrates that poli-
tics have exerted a pernicious influence upon regulation in this
area.
Depoliticization can operate to quell the problems of politi-
cized financial regulation. In regard to the savings and loan
crisis, depoliticization could have stemmed the crisis at several
crucial points. First, appropriate controls on thrift activities and
an appropriate examination of resources could have been de-
ployed based upon expertise instead of politics, and activities
that generated losses curtailed.4 Second, even failing that, if
capital standards had been enforced as originally contemplated,
without respect to politics, thrifts could have been shuttered be-
fore large costs were incurred. °0 After all, there was no nonpo-
litical basis for the policy of forbearance. This would have avoid-
ed the great majority of losses suffered.501
The SEC's inability to control the legislative initiatives to
curtail investor rights is a classic example of the problems of
political regulation.0 The evidence supporting the PSLRA and
the Uniform Act was flimsy at best.50 3 The money behind these
legislative initiatives was able to distort the legislative process,
and to obtain a result that was fundamentally at odds with
sound regulation. ° All sides of the debate recognized the SEC's
traditional expertise and discretion in defining investor rights.
50 5
Nevertheless, SEC expertise ultimately played little role in de-
fining the legislative outcome. 506 Expanded depoliticization could
deliver regulation based upon expertise in this area.
Depoliticization can also be of utility in addressing the com-
pensation controversy. Even staunch supporters of free-market
resolutions, such as Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, have ques-
498. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 299, at 26.
499. See supra notes 365-85 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 386-404 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 399-404 and accompanying text.
502. See Ramirez, supra note 344, at 1093.
503. See id.
504. See id. at 1093.
505. See id. at 1115.
506. See supra notes 345-56.
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tioned the appropriateness of executive compensation. °7 The
fragmented regulation of publicly held companies has led states
to seek concentrated benefits in exchange for costs imposed upon
the economy generally.0 8 Only a unified regulatory regime can
resolve this issue. By leaving this and other similar corporate
governance issues to agency expertise, adjustments to the cur-
rently prevailing market resolution can be undertaken based
upon the best evidence available.0 9
If depoliticization is deemed an appropriate policy option,
however, an important threshold issue should be addressed.
Outside of the context of the Fed's administration of monetary
policy, can additional depoliticization of financial regulation be
achieved? The first step to such depoliticization has been
achieved, albeit in a haphazard and chaotic fashion. Congress
has created specialized agencies to deal with virtually all aspects
of financial market regulation.510 Moreover, with little apparent
forethought, some of these agencies are endowed with a great
deal of structural independence. Very few areas of regulation,
nevertheless, have been as free of the influences of politics as
the Fed.51' The experience of the Fed provides some insight into
how an area of regulation can be depoliticized. Basically, it took
two catastrophic economic disruptions-the Panic of 1907 and
the Great Depression-for the Fed to achieve the independence
it wields today.1 2 The Banking Act of 1935 marked the begin-
ning of a truly independent Fed.51 ' This act occurred only in the
face of the calamity of the Great Depression, and only after the
outcry of noted scholars arguing for depoliticization.514
507. See Michael M. Phillips, Greenspan Hits Both Extremes of Wages, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 25, 1999, at A2 (-I find a lot of what is being paid to individual CEOs not
directed to the value that they are producing for their shareholders, who are paying
the bill . . ").
508. Delaware, for example, obtained 17.7% of its 1990 revenues from franchise
taxes paid by corporations. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, COR-
PORATIONS 125 (7th ed. 1995).
509. See supra notes 353-66 and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 25, 85 and accompanying text.
511. See supra notes 84-145 and accompanying text.
512. See supra notes 85, 98-107 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 98-103.
514. See J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN, THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACm. ITS ORIGIN AND
PROBLEMS 211-17 (1933) (recounting political problems of the Fed and stating "[h]ow
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Congress could take a significant step toward depoliticization
by consolidating regulatory agencies.515 For example, if there
were only one financial institution regulator, free of monetary
policy responsibilities, and one capital market regulator that
exclusively regulated publicly held companies, both regulatory
competition and regulatory turf battles could be curtailed. The
increased gravity, and more diverse regulatory activities of such,
would create a significant counterweight to agency capture. In
sum, although financial market regulatory power would be di-
vided among these agencies, the regulatory mass of each would
be more commensurate with the size of those they regulate. This
could further buttress an agency's political independence.
Of course, regulatory consolidation also can eliminate regula-
tory competition and assure that regulation is based upon ex-
pertise; thereby, it is responsive to the public interest instead of
special interests. For example, in the context of regulatory mod-
ernization, many commentators have stated that the risks of
expanded financial institutional powers can be contained
through rigid enforcement of capital standards for depository
institutions and erecting "fire walls" consisting of corporate veils
between affiliates undertaking new activities and depository
institutions.516 Noted economists, however, have shown that
taking prompt corrective action in response to eroding capital, as
measured by an accounting system that is necessarily a lagging
indicator of a bank's health, is likely to be "too little, too late"
and is not likely to prevent the next banking crisis.517 Similarly,
relying on fire walls certainly can protect banks from isolated
catastrophes that arise from new, riskier activities. Whether
long, 0 Lord, how long"). Professor Laughlin was involved intimately in the process
of the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act. See id. at vii.
515. Professor Bach summarized and rebutted the main policy arguments against
regulatory consolidation nearly three decades ago. See BAcH, supra note 230, at 230-
33.
516. See Hawke, supra note 327, at 778.
517. See Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, The Use of Capital Ratios to Trigger Inter-
vention in Problem Banks: Too Little, Too Late, NEW ENG. EcoN. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1996, at 49-58 (highlighting problems of relying upon capital ratios for prompt cor-
rective action); see also Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Will Legislated Early Inter-
vention Prevent the Next Banking Crisis?, S. ECON. J., July 1997, at 268-80 (stating
that new legislation requiring prompt corrective action is not materially different
from prior regulatory practice, and is not binding upon regulators).
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they will prevent a systemic catastrophe triggered by a general
asset value deflation like the Great Depression or the real estate
bust of the 1980s is another, unaddressed question.518 This Arti-
cle takes no position on these, or similar issues; instead, it at-
tempts to demonstrate that these issues are best resolved by
resort to regulatory experts acting in the public interest.
Bipartisan support is a necessary ingredient to the long-term
political independence of any administrative agency. The Fed
has enjoyed such support for decades. Many administrative
agencies, such as the SEC, must have bipartisan representation
on its governing body. Although the Fed is subject to no such
mandate, it enjoys other sources of bipartisan support. The Hoo-
ver Commission was not overly impressed with the bipartisan
requirement then prevailing at a number of agencies as a means
of assuring appropriate regulatory conduct.51 Nevertheless,
since the time of the Hoover Commission, our government has
had extended periods when the presidency has been controlled
by one party, while the Congress has been controlled by the
other party.520 Under these circumstances an agency is vulner-
able to political pressures if one party dominates its governing
body. Thus, a requirement that an agency enjoy bipartisan gov-
ernance is a means of assuring some degree of long-term biparti-
san support.
Another key to depoliticizing a regulatory area is the breadth
of delegations to the agency. For example, the Fed enjoys essen-
tially unlimited discretion over monetary policy. 2' Delegations
also furnish Congress with the ability to make institutional
statements regarding the proper extent of an agency's indepen-
518. See generally Hawke, supra note 327 (describing a proposal to modernize rules
governing financial services without jeopardizing existing federally insured institu-
tions, but failing to address the potential impact of an overall economic decline).
519. See HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64, at 431.
520. See, e.g., Gerald Ford, Counting Excesses in D.C., SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
May 23, 1999, at G4 (noting the presence of a Republican Congress during the Tru-
man Administration and a Democratic Congress during the Eisenhower Administra-
tion); David Teich, Cut the National Debt Before Taxes, Spending, SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 21, 1999, at A9 (noting the presence of a Republican President
and Democratic Congress in the early 1980s).
521. This regulatory monopoly is hardly accidental. Congress has twice affirmatively
acted to assure that the Fed does not lose control of monetary policy. See WOOLLEY,
supra note 108, at 41-46.
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dence in the context of legislative history. Although such state-
ments certainly are not binding upon a future Congress, they do
create risks for legislators who choose to ignore the basis for
independence. One example of such legislative history is the
Banking Act of 1935.522
Funding is key to independence. 5" There is no reason why a
unified financial regulator could not assess financial institutions
in much the same way as the Fed assesses its member banks."M
Similarly, the SEC already collects enough in fees to be self-
funded.525 Certainly, a more consolidated agency charged with
the regulation of publicly held companies can also achieve self-
funding. Although there may be constitutional issues implicated
in giving an agency the power of raising its own funds, each of
the broad areas discussed in this Article can support agencies
that raise sufficient funds to free themselves from the regulatory
appropriations process.526 Certainly, access to public trading
markets and the ability to act as a financial intermediary tradi-
tionally has been considered a beneficial grant that can be dis-
pensed in exchange for fees or other conditions.2 7
History demonstrates, however, that, unfortunately, such
drastic changes in the approach to regulation usually occur only
in response to severe economic disruptions.52 8 No major overhaul
of the fundamental structure of our financial market regulatory
structure has occurred in the absence of such a disruption. Nev-
ertheless, the costs of the maladies that inhere in the current
regulatory structure have been astounding. 52 9 Under these
circumstances perhaps Congress could restructure financial
522. See supra notes 98-107.
523. See supra notes 50-57.
524. See 12 U.S.C. § 243 (1994).
525. See Congress Forges SEC Plan, Snubs Self-Funding Idea, WALL ST. J., Aug.
17, 1994, at A4.
526. See National Cable Television Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-
42 (1974) (stating that the power to tax is vested in the legislature but that agen-
cies may assess fees to beneficiaries of grants).
527. See 12 U.S.C. § 243.
528. See, e.g., WoRSHAM, supra note 4, at 25 ("Historically, the periods of greatest
debate concerning reform of the financial regulatory structure occur during... in-
stances of panic and failure. .. ").
529. See supra notes 344-64, 411 and accompanying text.
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market regulation in accordance with the thesis of this Article
before another major regulatory failure. On the other hand,
because the nation's economy has grown to be so diverse and the
regulatory protections against further depressions seem to work
so well, even when such catastrophic disruptions occur, their
effects are blunted and no public outcry for substantial reform
arises. 3 It may well be that until abuses subvert the regulatory
system so deeply that an economic disruption of great propor-
tions results, the reforms discussed herein simply are not possi-
ble.
Another possibility is that the next presidentially led effort at
regulatory reform recognizes the utility of additional de-
politicization.53 ' Any such political effort to restructure the fi-
nancial regulatory structure could benefit from the business in-
terests that operate in the regulated environment of the nation's
financial markets. The proposal of this Article should be recog-
nized as a sound component of what Professor Gabriel Kolko has
termed "political capitalism."" 2 Kolko's definition of political
capitalism revolves around the use of governmental power to
secure an economic structure providing conditions of stability,
predictability, and security-all with the aim of rationalization
of the otherwise dangerous vicissitudes inherent in laissez-faire
capitalism." Kolko demonstrated that the economic reforms of
the Progressive Era, including the Federal Reserve Act of 1913,
were the result of the intentions of the business and political
class to attain a more stable and secure business environment
through government regulation."8 The costs of the current finan-
cial regulatory structure should, by now, be apparent to many
key leaders in the industries with stakes in governmental regu-
latory initiatives. Political capitalism has successfully allowed
our nation's economy to function at a high production level, with
530. Professor Worsham has noted that financial panics or failures provide feedback
to key players outside of a regulatory subsystem that something has to be done. See
WORSHAM, supra note 4, at 35. Worsham's observation raises the possibility that the
Fed is so adept at managing the economy that fundamental reform is not likely.
531. See id. at 46.
532. KOLKO, supra note 169, at 3.
533. See id. at 1-10.
534. See id.
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minimal disruption since 1933. Responsible business leaders
should recognize the utility of sound governmental regulation
and stand ready, to work with politicians, to make appropriate
regulatory adjustments.
CONCLUSION
The time has come for an end to depoliticization by accident.
Thus far, depoliticization has been underutilized and mentioned
rarely in scholarship or political discourse as a solution to the
problems of regulation. Depoliticizing regulation is a powerful
tool for achieving certain policy objectives. Specifically, in areas
of great complexity and little voter interest, depoliticization can
be used to resist regulatory domination by narrow special inter-
ests. Moreover, it can transfer regulatory power to experts, and
allow sophisticated regulation to operate relatively free from
immediate political concerns. Thus, depoliticization can help
assure that decisions are weighed appropriately in terms of costs
and benefits. In light of the advantages of depoliticization,
policymakers should begin to consider when the advantages of
depoliticization justify its increased use on a more principled
basis.
Once the advantages of depoliticization are understood, those
areas appropriate for depoliticizing can be identified. Depolitici-
zation may not be tolerable in some areas. In others, Congress
may be unwilling to part with power. There can be little doubt,
however, that depoliticized regulation can yield significant ad-
vantages in financial regulation. Our political system does not
function well in the context of financial regulation. The savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s, the rampant run of fraud in our
securities markets during the same period, and the obsolete
regulatory structure hobbling our financial markets all demon-
strate the dangers of political influence in the context of finan-
cial regulation. Similarly, the "reform" of private securities lit-
igation and the explosion of executive compensation also seem
best explained through an analysis of the political context in
which each of these phenomena occurred. The costs of these
problems are incalculable. The low issue saliency among voters
with respect to financial regulation, and the general acceptance
of the Fed's authority over monetary policy seem to support the
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political viability of insulating financial market regulators from
political influence.
Once depoliticization is understood as a tool, policymakers can
then address the degree of depoliticization that is desirable. The
degree of insulation to be accorded an agency seems to turn
upon many factors, but the most important appear to be the
funding of the agency and the extent of the political commitment
to an agency's independency. The Fed appears to be the most
independent agency because of its self-funding mechanism and
the reluctance of the political branches to encroach upon its turf.
Whether other financial agencies should be as independent as
the Fed is an issue beyond the scope of this Article. Perhaps this
issue can be addressed best only after further experience is had
with more independent agencies. Fundamentally, however, re-
cent history in financial market regulation strongly suggests
that agencies operating within this regulatory area, in general,
must move towards the Fed in terms of political insulation.
Another question should be considered: Assuming that de-
politicization can be a tool for more effective financial market
regulation, is it a politically viable option? Severe market dis-
ruptions or serious economic dislocation ordinarily has triggered
innovative regulation in the area of financial market regulation.
Perhaps some future disruption will prompt a reassessment of
the role of politics in this vital area of regulation. On the other
hand, it is also possible that as specific areas of regulation be-
come more complex, and therefore dangerous, a general political
consensus in favor of expert, nonpolitical regulation could
emerge. The best option may well be to pursue increased
depoliticization for financial markets on a gradual basis. This
will occur only if policymakers can be convinced of the long-term
stability and advantages of increased political insulation.
Finally, the conclusions of this Article should cause scholars
in other intensive areas of regulation to consider further
depoliticization as a means of solving common problems of gov-
ernmental dysfunction. The foregoing discussion has identified a
relatively narrow pattern of problems pervading a single regula-
tory area-the regulation of financial markets. Based upon the
conditions spawning these problems, this Article has addressed
financial market regulation specifically as an area that would
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benefit from further depoliticization. There must be others. The
degree of depoliticization advocated herein-specifically, inde-
pendent commissions governed by commissioners with tenure
and insulated from political interloping and the appropriations
process-already has attained a high level of constitutional ap-
proval. In the one regulatory area where it has been tested-the
government's management of monetary policy-it has functioned
largely in accordance with expectations. Given the high degree
of political cynicism that currently prevails in our political sys-
tem, any restructuring of regulation that would limit the power
of special interests would likely receive a positive political reac-
tion among voters. Consequently, expanded depoliticization
should be considered as an option to address the full panoply of
systemic problems plaguing the modern regulatory state.
